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INTRODUCTION

In November 2017, a committee of Congress did something it had not
done in over forty years: considered whether to limit the President's power to
unilaterally use nuclear weapons.' The committee hearing occurred amidst
increasingly bellicose rhetoric between the United States and North Korea. 2
It followed the introduction earlier that year of bills to require a congressional
declaration of war before the President authorized the first use of nuclear
weapons. 3 In spite of this renewed interest in the grave dangers of nuclear
Armageddon, the committee failed to reach an agreement on what, if anything,
should be done.4 Thus, the nuclear status quo remains unchanged: the
President has unilateral authority to order the use of nuclear weapons.
The conventional wisdom about presidential power to make war vis-a-vis
Congress posits that while the President may use military force to defend the
nation, any offensive use of force requires congressional authorization.5 Of
course, the reality was never as simple as the conventional wisdom held.
Presidents in the nineteenth century sometimes deployed the military prior to
congressional action.6 The notion of "defensive war" allowed presidents to
1.
FirstUse ofNuclear Weapons: PreservingResponsible Control: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Int'l Sec. and Sci. Affairs of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong. 3-4
(1976);
see
Patricia
Zengerle,
Senate
Committee
Questions
Trump's
NuclearAuthority, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkoreamissiles-usa-senate/senate-comnmittee-questions-trumps-nuclear-authority-idUSKBN1DE20N
[https://penna.cc/BU5S-P456]; see also Editorial,Rethinking the President'sNuclear Trigger,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2017, at A22.
2.
See Rethinking the President'sNuclear Trigger, supra note 1.
3.
Press Release, Ted Lieu, Congressman for Cal.'s 33rd Dist., Congressman Lieu,
Senator Markey Introduce the Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017 (Jan. 24,
2017),
https://lieu.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-lieu-senator-markeyintroduce-restricting-first-use-0 [https://penna.cc/DM2S-W5N4] (Representative Ted Lieu and
Senator Edward Markey introduced bills entitled the "Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons
Act of 2017"); see also Ankit Panda, "No First Use" and Nuclear Weapons, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Jul. 17, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclearweapons [https://perma.cc/HQ9B-Z7ZH].
4.
See Zengerle, supra note 1 ("'Ido not see a legislative solution today, but that doesn't
mean that over the course of the next several months one might develop,' [Senator Corker] told
reporters after the hearing.").
5.
See, e.g., LOuIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE PRESIDENT 284 (Princeton Univ. Press rev. ed. 1985) ("For constitutional as well as
practical reasons, the two activities are supposed to work in concert. The President commands
the troops but only Congress can provide them. Congress declares war but depends on the
President to wage it.").
6.
Id. at 287-89 (recounting actions by Jefferson and, most famously, Lincoln, to use
force first and seek authorization or ratification second); id. at 288 ("The executive may act
outside the law when necessity demands it, explain his actions, and ask the legislature for
acquittance.").
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take actions to defend the United States, its people, and its possessions outside
of the country.' After World War II, however, defensive war took "a quantum
jump, both conceptually and in practice." Post-World War II theory and
practice drifted toward allowing the President more and more authority to
"make war before Congress has had a chance to act." 9 Our strategic
commitments, our mutual defense obligations, and our far-flung military
bases expanded the range of our nation's protective cover.' 0
Nuclear weapons challenge this conventional thinking. The perfect storm
of our changing understanding of the constitutional rules for making war and
the imperatives of the nuclear age has conspired to blind us to constructive
examination of the issue." If the nation's defense strategy policy
contemplates a nuclear first strike capability or includes a nuclear first use
option, then the conventional constitutional wisdom appears to have little
meaning.1 2 Because of this, presidential power to unilaterally employ nuclear
weapons in an offensive context outside of retaliation for a sudden nuclear
attack raises serious constitutional questions about the proper distribution of
the power to make war.' 3
Building on this insight, this Article discusses the implications the
original meaning of the proper constitutional distribution of the war power as
it relates to the use of nuclear weapons. This Article aims to provide a
framework to answer the question of the constitutionality of the use of nuclear
weapons as the Framers might answer.
Part II discusses the relatively few legal scholars who address the
constitutional issues relating to the use of nuclear weapons. In Part III, I will
outline the development of the U.S. policies on using nuclear weapons. Part
IV discusses the need for congressional involvement in nuclear decision
making. Part V discusses what the historical sources tell us the Constitution's
Framers may have meant when they set out the Constitution's war powers. In
7.
Id. at 284, 292-93 (recounting actions by John Adams, James Polk, and William
McKinley that justified as defensive warfare).
8.
Id. at 292-93.
9.
Id. at 284.
10. Id. at 292-93 ("No longer did the administration confine the notion of 'repelling
sudden attacks' to military actions on our continental boundaries.").
11. See Paul A. Hemesath, Who 's Got the Button? Nuclear War Powers Uncertainty in
the Post-Cold War Era, 88 GEO. L.J. 2473, 2474 (2000) (arguing that the post-Cold War era
demands a fresh look at the constitutional rules for using nuclear weapons).
12. See Yonkel Goldstein, The Failure of Constitutional Controls Over War Powers in
the NuclearAge: The Argumentfor a ConstitutionalAmendment,40 STAN. L. REv. 1543 (1988)
("As the dangers of war have increased exponentially since the time when the Constitution was
ratified, the efficacy of the constitutional safeguards which were intended to limit the likelihood
of war has dwindled dramatically.").
13. Id.
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Part VI, I will use a contextual analysis borrowed from international law to
develop the constitutional principles that should guide our consideration of
these questions. Part VII discusses some proposals to limit or regulate
unilateral presidential power. Finally, Part VIII concludes this Article.

II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ON THE BOMB
Before the first atomic bomb exploded at the Trinity test site, Enrico
Fermi took bets with some of his Manhattan Project colleagues on whether or
not the explosion would ignite the atmosphere.'" Fermi's bet annoyed some
of the men engaged in the bomb's development." Months earlier, the
scientists had worked out the calculations and showed that an atmospheric
conflagration would not occur.1 6 Nevertheless, taking Fermi's money was not
a sure thing." After all, the United States created the bomb in haste and under
the pressure of war. Fears of a possible German development of an atomic
weapon prompted the Manhattan Project.' 8 Scientists developed the first
atomic bombs in an extraordinarily short amount of time: the Manhattan
Project received the go-ahead in 1942 and tested its creation on July 16,
1945.19 One scientist apologized for a program that had "too frequently

14.

ALLAN M. WINKLER, LIFE UNDER A CLOUD: AMERICAN ANXIETY ABOUT THE

ATOM 30 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993); RICHARD RHODES, MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 664
(Simon & Schuster 1986) [hereinafter RHODES, MAKING THE BOMB].
15. RHODES, MAKING THE BOMB, supra note 14, at 664 (noting the statement made by
General Leslie Groves, military head of the project: "I had become a bit annoyed with
Fermi . . when he suddenly offered to take wagers from his fellow scientists on whether or not
the bomb would ignite the atmosphere and, if so, whether it would merely destroy New Mexico
or destroy the world"). Kenneth Bainbridge, a fellow scientist, "was furious because Fermi's
'thoughtless bravado' might scare the soldiers" who did not have Fermi's knowledge of nuclear
fission. Id.
16. John Horgan, Bethe, Teller, Trinity and the End of Earth, SCI. AM.: CROSS-CHECK
(Aug. 4, 2015), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/bethe-teller-trinity-and-theend-of-earth/ [https://penna.cc/3DJJ-3YSZ].
17. RHODES, MAKING THE BOMB, supra note 14, at 664-65 ("[A] new force was about
to be loosed on the world; no one could be absolutely certain Fermi's point of the outcome
of its debut.").
18.

R.G. GRANT, WHY DID HIROSHIMA HAPPEN? 17 (2011); RHODES, MAKING THE

BOMB, supra note 14, at 403-07; see id. at 457 (explaining that Japan was also working on an
Atomic Bomb); ROBERT S. NORRIS, RACING FOR THE BOMB: GENERAL LESLIE GROVES, THE
MANHATTAN PROJECT'S INDISPENSABLE MAN 450 (2002) (concluding that only a few Japanese
scientists had been working on atomic research with very little to show for it); see also THOMAS
POWERS, HEISENBERG'S WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE GERMAN BOMB, at vii (1993).
19. F.G. GOSLING, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: MAKING THE ATOMIC BOMB 63, 65

(1999).
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reduced to guesswork and empirical shortcuts." 20 Moreover, the scientists
working on the project constantly went beyond the limits of both practical and
theoretical knowledge as each corresponding step toward completion of the
weapon brought new and unexpected problems. 21 Finally, nothing like the
new weapon had ever been tried before.22 No government had ever lavished
the amount of money on the development of a weapon like the United States
did on the Manhattan Project. 23 Neither had any government ever tested such

a device before. The actual, as opposed to the theoretical result, was
unknown. 24

Fermi's macabre bet, and the uncertainty which generated it, illustrated
the difficulty of thinking about nuclear weapons. 25 In 1945, no one really
knew the precise effects of an atomic explosion. For example, the first atomic
scientists greatly underestimated the amount of radiation released by nuclear
fission (and later fusion). 26 Later, scientists also became aware of the
electromagnetic pulse, a pulse of electricity that can disrupt and destroy the
electrical systems of an entire continent.27 Today scientists agree that large
scale nuclear war would have a dramatic effect on the world's climate. 28 They
only disagree on how much of an effect it would have. 29
Seen through this haze of uncertainty, Einstein's purported dictum-to
change our way of thinking 30-becomes doubly difficult if we are not even

20. RHODES, MAKING THE BOMB, supra note 14, at 576 (quoting George B.
Kistiakowsky).
21. Id. at 305. In 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to a Belgian ambassador warning
that the Nazis may be developing an atomic weapon. RICHARD RHODES, DARK SUN: THE
MAKING OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB 433 (1995) [hereinafter RHODES, DARK SUN].
22. See RHODES, MAKING THE BOMB, supra note 14, at 576.
23.

See JOEL LEVITT, MANAGING MAINTENANCE SHUTDOWNS AND OUTAGES 101 (1st

ed. 2004).
24.
25.
26.

See RHODES, MAKING THE BOMB, supra note 14, at 315.
MICHAEL QUINLAN, THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 13 (2009).
See Len Ackland, U.S. Warhead Production, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,

Jan./Feb. 1988, at 2; see also GERARD DEGROOT, THE BOMB: A LIFE 275-76 (2005) (describing
the "shocking ignorance" of scientists who allowed soldiers to inspect the Japanese bomb sites a
few weeks after the attacks, even telling them to drink water from the local sources).
27.
28.

ElectromagneticPulse, ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA (1989).
MALCOM CHALMERS, LESS IS BETTER: NUCLEAR RESTRAINT AT Low NUMBERS 28

(Adrian Johnson & Ashlee Godwin eds., 2012).
29. RAYMOND L. MURRAY & KEITH E. HOLBERT, NUCLEAR ENERGY:
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS, SYSTEMS, AND APPLICATIONS (7th ed. 2015).

AN

30. Einstein said, "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our
modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." Atomic Education Urged
by Einstein, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1946, at 13. He is also reported to have said, "The world as
we have created it is a process of our thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our
thinking." However, little authority exists to definitively link him with this quote, and it may be
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sure what we are supposed to be thinking about. For most people, the weight
of technical difficulty, the staggering proportions, and the inevitable
uncertainty leads to simplistic conclusions. Either they conclude that if
nuclear weapons are ever used again it will mean an immediate end of the
world or they conclude that the effects of nuclear war won't be as bad as
predicted. As Leon Wieseltier has said, "If there is anything as foolish as not
thinking about nuclear weapons, it is not thinking about them enough." 3
By and large, legal scholarship has not given nuclear weapons enough
thought.32 Shortly after World War II, William Borden, a lawyer, wrote one
of the first strategic analyses of nuclear warfare.33 Borden attacked the notion
of mutual strategic deterrence. 3 4 He argued that war between world powers

a conflation of other similar statements. See Albert Einstein,
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert Einstein [https://penna.cc/529G-26TJ].
31.

WIKIQUOTE,

LEON WIESELTIER, NUCLEAR WAR, NUCLEAR PEACE 2 (1983).

32. Although not a legal scholar, Hennan Kahn thought a lot about nuclear weapons at
the beginning of the nuclear era. See generally HERMAN KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR
(1960) (arguing that mutually assured destruction was a flawed strategy and that the United
States should planto fight and wina nuclear war, and noting that Kahn's ideas greatly influenced
the nation's nuclear policies and continue to do so to the present); HERMAN KAHN, ON
ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS, at x (Frederick A. Praeger 1965) [hereinafter
KAHN, METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS]; SHARON GHAMARI-TABRIZI, THE WORLDS OF HERMAN

KAHN 41 (2005) (discussing how Kahn's willingness to dispassionately discuss the
consequences of nuclear war contributed to the creation of Dr. Strangelove in the satirical film
of the same name).
33. See generally WILLIAM LISCUM BORDEN, THERE WLL BE NO TIME: THE
REVOLUTION IN STRATEGY (1946). Borden would later write a letter to the FBI Director, J.
Edgar Hoover, accusing the nuclear scientist, J. Robert Oppenheimer, of being a communist
agent. See XV U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER:
TRANSCRIPT
OF HEARING BEFORE PERSONNEL
SECURITY BOARD
2837, 2857

(1954), https://www.osti.gov/includes/opemet/includes/Oppenheimer%/`2Ohearings/Vol%/`20X
V%/o200ppenheimer.pdf [https://penna.cc/2EJV-K4T3] (documenting William Borden's
reading of his letter, in full, before the Board). This letter led to an investigation of Oppenheimer
and, ultimately, the revocation of Oppenheimer's security clearance and the end of his
government career. See Barton J. Bernstein, The Oppenheimer Loyalty-Security Case
Reconsidered, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1383-84 (1990). See generally KAI BIRD & MARTIN J.
SHERWIN, AMERICAN PROMETHEUS: THE TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY OF J. ROBERT
OPPENHEIMER 478 (2005); GREGG HERKEN, BROTHERHOOD OF THE BOMB: THE TANGLED
LIVES AND LOYALTIES OF ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, ERNEST LAWRENCE, AND EDWARD TELLER
267 (2002); PHILIP M. STERN, THE OPPENHEIMER CASE: SECURITY ON TRIAL 1 (1969).

34. BORDEN, supra note 33, at 87 ("A full scale atomic war will not be won by
pulverizing cities and industry, though this may be done as an incidental measure, but by
destroying the enemy's military power of retaliation."); see also id. at 225 ("Unless a world
government intercedes in time, an attack on the United States will surely come.").
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was inevitable35 and that nuclear weapons would be used.3 6 Because of this,
the United States should prepare to fight and win a nuclear conflict.37 He
asserted that nuclear war could happen upon literally a moment's notice and
its outcome decided over the course of a few hours.38 Therefore, the President
should at all times have the great powers that are typically only reserved for
during a declared war.39 Borden believed the President must have the power
to "order any war prosecuted to a successful conclusion, regardless of the
cost." 0 Indeed, as long as a vital minority of civilian defense workers
remained loyal to the government, a nuclear war would not even need the
support of the American people. 4
Borden's premises-that nuclear war will come in an instant and
therefore the President must have the power to respond immediately-have
structured what little debate there has been about the constitutional aspects of
nuclear war. The presidential scholar, Edward Corwin, included discussion
about nuclear weapons in his critique of the post-war Constitution. 42 In Total
War and the Constitution, Corwin remarked that "if we take [the atomic
bomb's] menace with proper seriousness," it will likely have "a considerable
effect on both our industrial and our constitutional structure." 43 He added:
[T]he effect will not be confined to wartime (wars waged with atomic
bombs are likely to be over in a few hours) but will spread through

35. Id. at 41 ("An armed peace cannot persist indefinitely, that either war or voluntary
federation must resolve the truce."). Interestingly, Borden posited the inevitability of war only
in the absence of powerful and effective international control over nuclear weapons. See also id.
(Unless the Soviet Union and the United States "can unite in a single sovereignty ... war
between them is as inescapable as the physical law that oil and water do not mix.").
36. See id. at 28-29.
37. See id. at 225.

38. Id. at 84 ("In all human probability such a conflict would be brief and one-sided
(perhaps lasting only a few hours .. .)").
39. See id. at 84-87 (explaining how quickly nuclear war could devastate the country
when the approval of many is needed to retaliate).
40. Id. at 84.
41. Id.
42. Corwin published an essay in 1951 on the subject. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, The
Atom Bomb and the Constitution, in CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 167 (Kenneth D. Crews ed.,
1986) [hereinafter CORWIN, The Atom Bomb]. The essay only briefly discussed presidential
power. See id. at 188 (explaining that failure to seek declaration from Congress if defensive
force leads to "real war" would be "one more step toward Presidential autocracy"). Rather, the
essay focused on the need for international agreements and cooperation to defend against the
use of nuclear weapons. Id. at 173.
43. EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1947) [hereinafter
CORWIN, TOTAL WAR].
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peacetime. The effect of the impact of total war on the Constitution
will thus become embedded in our peacetime Constitution.4 4
Although Corwin acknowledged the effect nuclear weapons might have
on the structure of the government, his concern (at least initially) was the
effect of this peacetime mobilization on individual rights.45 In the end, he
rejected the notion that atomic weapons made war "impossible." 4' The atomic
bomb, he noted wryly, "may have effectively prevented all future wars except
the next one, but that is just the war that today has mankind so deeply, so
justifiably troubled." 4 7
Corwin was not specific, however, about how to reconcile the nuclear
age with constitutional structure. In other contexts, he voiced his fear
of "presidential autocracy." 48 He saw Congress, not the courts, as the
remedy to this problem: [E]scape must be sought from 'presidential
autocracy' by resort not to the judicial power, but to the legislative
power-in other words, by resort to timely action by Congress and to
procedures for the meeting of emergency situations so far as these
can be intelligently anticipated. 49
He argued for the creation of a joint congressional committee to supplant
any individual committees and to receive all communications on nuclear
policy. o In some unspecified way, this new committee would consult with
the President and direct Congress take appropniate action. Presumably, these
devices also applied to questions of nuclear strategy.
After Corwin, Raoul Berger was one of the first constitutional scholars to
address the question of the application of constitutional norms to modem
warfare." Berger did not address nuclear war directly in his scholarship,
however. Rather, he publicly endorsed the Federation of American Scientists'
(FAS) proposal to rein in the President's power through the creation of a

44. Id.
45. Id. at 181; see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, Our ConstitutionalRevolution and How to
Round It Out, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION 157, 160-61 (Richard Loss
ed., 1976) (noting that war watered down the notion of enumerated powers).
46. See CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 43, at 9.
47. Id. at 9-10.
48. See CORWIN, The Atom Bomb, supra note 42, at 188.
49. Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 53, 66 (1953).
50. EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 298 (4th
rev ed. 1957) [hereinafter CORWIN, OFFICE AND POWERS].
51. Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 80-82 (1972).
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consultation committee.5 2 Berger supported the FAS proposal saying that "the
authority 'to repel attacks' does not give the president any blanket authority
to conduct war."53 It was "an extraordinary interpretation," to say "that once
we have been fired upon, Congress just becomes a wooden Indian" with "no
further participation" in a war.5 4
Berger's discussion is short like Corwin's but for a different reason.
Corwin was constrained by the lack of development. He acknowledged that
his remarks on the subject were premature because "the strategy from the
horrendous discovery has still to be elaborated." 5 5 His remarks at that time
were tentative and introductory because the technology was new. Berger, on
the other hand, was constrained by more remote events. To him, the intent of
the Framers as evidenced by the historical record guided all questions of
constitutional interpretation.56
Berger advocated a return to the original constitutional distribution of
powers.5 7 Berger believed that "Congress, not the President, was given
virtually plenary power to deal with all facets of war-making," leaving the
President only the power to repel sudden attacks on the U.S. 58

Corwin disagreed with the notion that the Constitution "contained in
embryo from the outset the entirety of constitutional law." 59 Although this
overstates Berger's position, his fidelity to the Framers is the hallmark of his

52.

Charles Mohr, NuclearFirst Use is Revived as an Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1984,

§ 1, at 19.
53.

Murrey Marder, Scientists Call for an Additional Lock' on The Nuclear Trigger,

WASH. POST, Sept.

9, 1984, at A14.

54. Id.
55. CORWIN, The Atom Bomb, supra note 42.
56. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY];

Raoul Berger, OriginalistTheories of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 350,
353-54 (1988) [hereinafter Berger, OriginalistTheories].

The cardinal index of constitutionality is the Constitution itself, not what others have
said about it . .. we must look at the Constitution with eyes uncloudedby the opinions
of others. On so great a constitutional issue, nothing less suffices than the most
searching analysis of the immediately relevant text and what the Framers stated they
meant to accomplish by it.
Berger, supra note 51, at 3 1-32.
57. Berger, supra note 51, at 29.
58. Id. at 45.
59. EDWARD S. CORWIN, The Dissolving Structure of Our Constitutional Law, in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 141, 142. Corwin maintained
this view in his later works. See EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-9, 12-13 (1955); EDWIN S. CORWIN, The President's
Power, in THE PRESIDENT: ROLE AND POWERS 361 (1965); CORWIN, OFFICE AND POWERS,

supra note 50.
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constitutional scholarship.6 0 Nevertheless, they both agree that the President
has the power to defend the country by retaliating against a sneak nuclear
attack.
Neither Corwin nor Berger say very much about the relationship of
constitutional war powers and nuclear warfare because their statements were
part of larger works written against the background of more immediate and
practical events. 61 Therefore, nuclear weapons were not the specific focus of
their work. For Corwin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "aggrandizement" of
power during World War II and its perpetuation thereafter obliterated what
Corwin called the "constitutional law of peace. "62 Berger wrote during the
late Vietnam War era when Congress was either debating or had just enacted
the War Powers Act.63
In contrast, Arthur S. Miller's concern was nuclear war. 64 In 1982, Miller
wrote that "[t]he time has come for lawyers to confront the question of
whether nuclear weapons-their manufacture, deployment, and use-can be
justified under constitutional or international law." 65 Miller, quoting Einstein,
declared that the time had come to "change our modes" of thinking about the
constitutionality of nuclear weapons and sought in his work to do that.66
Miller outlined five possible constitutional sources for his claim that nuclear
weapons were unconstitutional: the Preamble,'6 7 the congressional war
power,'

the constitutional power to punish offenses, 69 and the integration of

international law norms into the Constitution.70 A fifth argument-that
government has an affirmative duty to protect the citizens-springs from
several sources, most importantly the Due Process Clause.71

60. See Berger, Originalist Theories, supra note 56; Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove s
Rendition of OriginalMeaning, 72 U. IND. L.J. 619, 619 (1997).
61. See Berger, supra note 51, at 47.
62. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 43, at 149-50, 184.
63. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §1543 (2012). See generally BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 56 (writing on how interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment were counter to the Framers' underlying intent).
64. Arthur S. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and ConstitutionalLaw, 7 NOvAL. REv. 21, 2123 (1982).
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id. at 27.
68. Id. at 29.
69. Id. at 32.
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id. at 35.
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Miller's work is significant. It is the first piece of constitutional
scholarship addressed to the problem of nuclear war. Its creativity stimulated
thought on the problem. It is flawed, however. His argument concerning the
Preamble illustrates the flaws found throughout his work.
Miller cannot settle on a position to take in regard to the Preamble. At
first, he wants to give it substantive content. 72 Miller argued that the goals of
the Preamble provided a starting point for more detailed analysis. 73 Nuclear
weapons threaten these goals: to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty on ourselves and on our
posterity. 7 4 He concluded that "no one can argue that threatening the very
existence of 'posterity' can be constitutional." 75
This seems to imply that once the substance was ascertained it could be
enforced, but he is quick to qualify this statement: "The [P]reamble is not part
of the Constitution," he says "[i]t precedes it." 76 It "sets the tone for the
meaning to be given to the specific provisions" of the Constitution.7 7 Yet this
cannot be his argument, however. Many people can argue nuclear weapons

72.
73.
74.

Id. at 27.
See id. at 28.
Id.; see U.S. CONST. pmbl.

75. Miller, supra note 64, at 28. For an invocation of posterity to argue against the holding
in Roe v. Wade, see Raymond Marcin, "Posterity" in the Preamble and a Positivist Pro-Life
Position, 38 AM. J. JuRIS. 273, 283 (1993) ("In light of the case law on [p]reambles in general

and on the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States in particular, it would seem that
some limited use may be made of the 'Blessings of Liberty to . . .our Posterity' clause in
shedding light on the spirit behind the [F]ifth and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments' rights to life and
liberty.").
76. Miller, supra note 64, at 27. This is the conventional position. See Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 13 (1905) ("Although [the United States' Constitution's] Preamble
indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it
has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government
of the United States, or on any of its Departments. Such powers embrace only those expressly
granted in the body of the Constitution, and such as may be implied from those so granted.
Although, therefore, one of the declared objects of the Constitution was to secure the blessings
of liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power can
be exerted to that end by the United States unless, apart from the Preamble, it be found in some
express delegation of power or in some power to be properly implied therefrom."). But see John
W. Welch & James A. Heilpern, Recovering Our Forgotten Preamble, 91 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021,
1022 (2018) (arguing that the Preamble "deserves a primary place in constitutional law, in
federal judicial decision-making, and in the nation's civic discourse").
77. See Miller, supra note 64, at 27; see also Kenneth Shuster, Because of History,
Philosophy, the Constitution, Fairness& Need: WhyAmericans Have a Right to NationalHealth
Care, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 75, 89-91 (2013) (arguing that the Preamble supports a

constitutional right to health care).
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very effectively advance the goals of the Preamble. 78 Indeed, the notion of

mutual deterrence quite clearly provides for the common defense and protects
posterity in a way that other conventional means cannot; it makes total war
absolute and therefore unthinkable. 79 Miller's argument from the Preamble
does not advance his ultimate thesis unless the Preamble is given substantive
content. Thus, we see Miller arguing essentially this syllogism: The Preamble
requires the protection of posterity, and nuclear weapons will wipe out
posterity, thereby rendering nuclear weapons as unconstitutional. 80
Miller also feints in the direction of natural law. After again disclaiming
that the Preamble has any enforceable content, he goes on to say that its goals
implicate "a higher law than the Constitution.""' He asks somewhat
rhetorically, "[C]an a principle of natural justice . . be employed to
determine the validity of nuclear weapons?" 82 He gives an unqualified
affirmative answer.83 His position is ripe with possibility. One wants to know
the source of these great principles, their content, and their discernment. The
structural implication of this natural law thesis raises many questions. Yet
Miller leapfrogs the specifics of the argument: "Without going further into the
complex question of natural justice, what particular provisions . . . are
conceivably relevant to the nuclear weapons situation?""' Miller raises the
issue of natural law, then abandons it. If the Preamble implicates natural law,
then these implications need to be explored. If the Preamble does not implicate
natural law, then raising it in connection with Miller's argument concerning
the Constitution makes little sense.

78. See cf C. Dean McGrath Jr., The Genius of the Constitution: The Preamble and the
War on Terror, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13, 18 (2005) (arguing that the Preamble provided
support for the Bush Administration's war on terror policies).
79. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Banning the Bomb: Law andIts Limits, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
653, 660 (1986) (reviewing NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW (Arthur S. Miller& Martin Feinrider
eds., 1984)) ("The problem with basing a constitutional argument against nuclear weapons on
the desire for self-preservation is that no one has yet devised a better way to defend the United
States against nuclear destruction than through the maintenance of a credible nuclear force to
deter the execution of external threats.").
80. See Miller, supra note 64, at 28 ("Since nuclear weapons threaten the goals of the
[P]reamble, the meaning is that there will be no posterity left to pick up the pieces after the
bombs have exploded. Not only will the constitutional order have vanished, but quite possibly
civilization itself. No one can validly argue that threatening the very existence of 'posterity' can
be constitutional.").
81. Id. at 28 (quoting Governor William Seward, Speech to the United States Senate
(Mar. 11, 1850)).
82. Id. at 29.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Finally, without natural law, one is left with the contradiction between
Miller's assertions of a contentless Preamble and a Preamble that
affirmatively requires the protection of posterity. One searches in vain in the
rest of the article for the resolution of this conflict.
Only when Miller reaches his fifth point-that the government has an
affirmative duty to protect the people-does he return briefly to the
Preamble. 5 Indeed, it's not even clear that Miller keeps faith with his initial
proposition that the Preamble sets the tone for the interpretation of the rest of
the Constitution."' In short, Miller's arguments turn constitutional law on its
head. He seems to say that nuclear weapons are terrible; therefore, they must
be unconstitutional. 7 If there is to be a legal condemnation of nuclear
weapons, the Constitution, with its accumulated baggage of history, custom,
and precedent must do so. It does not serve the cause of constitutional
government to allow our fear of nuclear war to swallow the document. If we
worry about the death of law through nuclear holocaust, we must not engage
in a kind of symbolic nuclear destruction of the Constitution."
Miller seems to recognize this.8 9 The strongest (and longest) part of his
article is a more or less conventional analysis of the war powers of Congress
where he argues that Congress, not the President, has the exclusive power to
make war. 90

In their 1986 book, To Chain the Dog of War,91 Francis Wormuth and
Edwin Firmage devote a chapter to the question of the constitutional war
power and nuclear weapons. 92 They argue that the Constitution gives
Congress the war power "leaving the President only limited authority to act
unilaterally in extraordinary situations." 93 This division of power "reflects the

85. Miller, supra note 64, at 36.
86. Id. at 31-32 ("Circumstances have changed so radically since 1787, and even since
the first primitive atom bombs were exploded in 1945, that old practices and old modes of
thinking about constitutional propriety must be re-examined. New doctrine must be discovered:
The government must be obliged, as Madison said, to control itself.").
87. See id. at 28; see also id. at 36 ("Nuclear weapons so endanger the lives, liberties, and
property of all Americans that they should be considered to be a deprivation contrary to due
process.").
88. See Stephen Carter, War Making Under the Constitution, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES? 109 (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 1987).
89. See Miller, supra note 64, at 32.
90. Id. ("To permit the President alone to have the power to trigger thermonuclear war is
contrary both to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. The failure of Congress to retrieve
its war-making authority can no longer be tolerated.").
91. FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR (Univ.
of Ill. Press, 2d ed. 1989).
92. Id. at 271-82.
93. Id. at 271.
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[F]ramers' desire that deliberation and debate be brought to bear on any
decision so momentous as to commit the nation to war."94 Unfortunately,
nuclear war "seems to preclude the luxury of deliberation and debate,
requiring instead secrecy and dispatch." 95
Although some conclude that nuclear war renders the Constitution's
division of power obsolete, 96 Wormuth and Firmage resist this temptation.
Instead, they argue that the unique nature of nuclear war requires particular
attention to the Constitution's allocation of war making authority more than
ever:
The [F]ramers' judgment, inescapably value-laden was that, matters
of war and peace-now writ large, in matters of extinction and
survival-collective conscience, rather than individual whim, must
prevail. If the [F]ramers were chary of permitting the President to
wield muskets and sail ships surely we must pause to consider the
wisdom of allowing our presidents to unilaterally control the vast
nuclear arsenal. 97

'

Nuclear weapons change the nature of warfare in several ways. First, they
are qualitatively different from other weapons in their sheer destructive
power. 98 Second, modem delivery systems are quick, accurate, and widely
dispersed. 99 Third, there are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons dispersed
among the (growing) handful of countries in the nuclear club.' Fourth, the
devastation wrought by all out nuclear war is almost unimaginable.' 0

94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Carter, supra note 88, at 123.
WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 91, at 272.

97.
98. Id. When To Chain the Dog of War was published in 1989, the world's nuclear
arsenals possessed more than 6,000 times the destructive potential of all the shells fired and
bombs dropped in World War II-including the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Id. For a
description of the development of the incomparably more powerful Hydrogen Bomb, see
generally RHODES, DARK SUN, supra note 21.
99. WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 91, at 272-73. It took the plane carrying the
Hiroshima bomb six and a half hours to travel 1,700 miles, but intercontinental ballistic missiles
travel thousands of miles in minutes and nuclear submarines patrolling the oceans place weapons
even closer to their intended targets. Id. at 273.
100. Id. This number of weapons and their dispersal raises the possibility of accidental
nuclear war. Id. at 273-74.
101. Id. at 274-77. Over 1 billion people could be killed immediately in an all-out nuclear
exchange while another billion people would die within six months from radiation sickness. Id.
at 274-75. In addition, millions more would perish from the environmental and social effects of
a nuclear exchange: nuclear winter and a breakdown of social order. Id. at 275-76. Wormuth
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These changes to warfare dictate a return to the Framers' approach to war
making:
Surely the wisdom of the [F]ramers is unassailable: deliberation and
debate are essential before this nation commits itself to those initial
steps toward nuclear war that, once taken, may not be retraceable.
Congressional powers over the conduct of foreign relations and,
ultimately, the war power, must be invoked before the state becomes
committed to a course of conduct that is deterministic and
irreversible, a course that allows not alternative to nuclear war.1 02
Legal scholarship on the constitutional dimensions of nuclear war reached
its zenith with the publication of First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the
Constitution, Who Decides?103 This collection of essays grew out of a
symposium hosted by the Federation of American Scientists and the Lawyers
Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control.1 04 The topics ranged from presidential
first use 0 5 to the allocation of constitutional power 0 6 to specific suggestions
for implementing controls on the use of nuclear weapons.1 07
Jeremy Stone, whose essay was published in that collection, argued that
the first use of nuclear weapons was unconstitutional. 08 Stone conceded that
"few would question the right of a President to respond with nuclear weapons"
to a nuclear attack but the first use of nuclear weapons "raises quite different
questions."1 09 Unlike a sudden surprise nuclear attack, conventional wars are
not won or lost in minutes. 0 Indeed, it would take several hours to release
the tactical nuclear weapons to be used in the most likely scenario: an attack

and Firmage noted that experts "grimly concluded, extinction of the human species itself cannot
be excluded." Id. at 276.
102. WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 91, at 277.
103. FIST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?,

supra note 88. For an earlier compendium, see NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE LAW (Arthur
Selwyn Miller & Martin Feinrider eds., 1984).
104. FIST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?,

supra note 88, at vii.
105. See Jeremy J. Stone, PresidentialFirst Use Is Unlawful, in FIST USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?, supra note 88, at 3.

106. See Debate: Allocating War Powers Under the Constitution, in FIST USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?, supra note 88, at 93.

107.
108.
109.
110.

See Carter,supra note 88, at 109.
Stone, supra note 105, at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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on a NATO ally."' This would give the President ample time to consult on
the decision. He noted:
[S]etbacks in a conventional war overseas would not cost the United
States its existence, its freedom, or its ability to pursue the conflict
over time and in other ways, as America did in two world wars. 112
Stone argued that the Constitution requires Congress to authorize
offensive use of the military." 3 Using nuclear weapons to respond to a nonnuclear attack is so disproportionate that it constitutes "an entirely new war in
common-sense terms.""' In legal terms, the first use of nuclear weapons
without a declaration of war "would have gone from trying to 'repel' an attack
on our forces and allies abroad to initiating just that kind of much wider
commitment that the Founding Fathers wanted to be made by Congress."" 5
Professor John Norton Moore disagreed with Stone. To Moore, it is:
[A] paradigm principle of American constitutional law that the
President may conduct hostilities against an attacking nation,
including in extremis making decisions to employ nuclear weapons
in settings where, as here, Congress has not enacted any prohibition
on such use."

6

The more interesting (and real) constitutional question, according to
Moore, was "the power of Congress to place policy limits on the exercise by
the President of his power as Commander in Chief to conduct hostilities."" 7
Moore notes that the issue is unsettled and the sources ambiguous. "1 Indeed,
the sources are circular. 119 Ultimately, Moore doubts that Congress can put

111. Id. at 5,8.
112. Id. at 5.
113. See id.
114. Id.at 8.
115. Id.
116. John Norton Moore, The Constitution, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence: An
Analysis of the FAS Proposal, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?, supra note 88, at 23, 29.
117. Id.

118. Id.
119. Id. (first citing Swaimv. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), aff'd, 165 U.S.
553 (1897) ("The President cannot, under the disguise of military orders, evade the legislative

regulations by which he in common with the Army must be governed; and Congress cannot in
the disguise of 'rules of government' of the Army impair the authority of the President as
commander in chief."); and then citing United States v. Myers 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that
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any limits on the Commander in Chief power.1 20 Even if the legal issue were
resolved in favor of Congress, "its real world effect would be to reduce
deterrence and crisis stability."'21
Robert Turner took a less measured approach in his essay. Turner argued
that any limits on the President's Commander in Chief power would be
"flagrantly unconstitutional . . . and rather than promote peace, [it] would
weaken our deterrent and make both conventional and nuclear war more
likely."' 22 Turner asserted that the Framers vested the "supreme command"
of the military in the President.1 23 Congress could do nothing to limit or direct
this command.1 24 Impeachment was the only constitutional remedy for a
President who wrongly started a war.1 25
Professor Stephen Carter adopted a position based both on the system of
checks and balances, and the separation of powers. He argued that the
President may use nuclear weapons to defend the country or its interests even
in response to a conventional attack but that Congress may restrict the
President's ability to do so.1 26 Carter said, "We cannot wish nuclear weapons

Congress cannot invade powers held exclusively by the President)). The real question is whether
the power to engage in offensive action is one of the President's exclusive powers.
120. Moore, supra note 116, at 33-34.
121. Id. at 34 ("[T]he no first use proposals, in both their substantive and procedural
variants, seem largely cosmetic.").
122. Robert Turner, CongressionalLimits on the Commander in Chief The FASProposal,
in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?, supra note

88, at 36, 36. Turner responded to Stone's proposal to create a consultation committee that could
veto Presidential action. This specific proposal would be unconstitutional. Turner's objection
would extend to any limitation on the President's commander in chief power. See INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
123. Turner, supra note 122, at 39 ("[T]he supreme command and all decisions which
accompany it, such as where to deploy forces in peacetime to deter war, and what forces and
weapons to employ, and in what manner in order to defeat an enemy in the event hostilities break
out are confided exclusively by the Constitution in the President."). Curiously, Turner did not
cite Federalist 69 where Hamilton used the "supreme command" phrase seemingly to downplay
the President's commander in chief power. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

246 (Univ. Press of Kan., 3d ed. rev.

1991) (observing that Federalist69 offered a "modest definition" of President's power).
124. Turner, supra note 122, at 39.
125. Id. Moore accuses Stone of being unrealistic, but one wonders whether impeachment
is a realistic expectation in the era of Mutually Assured Destruction. The danger no first use
proposals address is the possible escalation of a conventional conflict to a thermonuclear
exchange of strategic missiles. Edwin E. Smith, CongressionalAuthorization of Nuclear First
Use: Problems of Implementation, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?, supra note 88, at 169, 174 (arguing impeachment is no remedy

if there is no functioning country left).
126. Carter, supra note 88, at 110. Carter approves this power so long as Congress properly
uses one of its delegated powers and does not exceed any limits on those powers. Id.
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away, and we cannot excise them through judicial fiat either." 27 Even though
a nuclear bomb "is a weapon of almost unimaginable destructive power," that
fact is "devoid of constitutional significance." 28 This new crisis demands a
wise political solution but Carter believed that:
[T]he urgent necessity for political solutions to the nuclear
conundrum does not alter the meaning of the structural provisions
establishing the system of balanced and separated powers. And under
those provisions, unless Congress acts, the discretion to use or abuse
all American armed forces rests with the President of the United
States. 129

According to Carter, we may not have much of country left standing after
a full nuclear exchange, but we should not ignore the Constitution in pursuit
of our security. 130

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POLICY
By the late 1960s, the structure of United States nuclear policy had taken
shape: the United States would launch a devastating nuclear attack on the
Soviet Union if attacked with nuclear weapons and reserved the right to launch
a nuclear attack if the Soviet Union attacked U.S. NATO allies. 11' This policy
formed in the Cold War era when the Soviet Union, and its nuclear-armed ally
China, were the primary adversaries to the United States and its nuclear-armed
allies. 132

Much prior scholarship proceeds from the assumption that nuclear war
will occur quickly and end quickly, and that total destruction of at least the
United States, if not the world, will result." This perception arises from the
doctrine of mutual assured destruction. 134

127. Id. at 119.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 122.
131. See generally RICHARD RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY: THE MAKING OF THE
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE (2007) [hereinafter RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY]; DONALD M. SNOW,
NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN A DYNAMIC WORLD: AMERICAN POLICY IN THE 1980S (1981).
132. SNOw, supra note 131, at 51; RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at 74.
See generally FRED KAPLAN, THE WIZARDS OF ARMAGEDDON 148-54 (1991).

133. See Col. Alan J. Parrington, USAF, Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited:
Strategic Doctrine in Question, AIRPOWER J., Winter 1997, at 5, 6.
134. Id.
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This doctrine started quite early in the Post-Hiroshima era' 35 and took
shape in the Eisenhower Administration as a "massive retaliatory power,"
positing that if nuclear weapons are used against the United States, the country
will reply with such force as to assure the total destruction of the adversary.13 6
Even then, however, the purely deterrent function of nuclear weapons became
mixed with other, more aggressive uses. For example, in 1947 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff argued for the necessity of the "Super Bomb" (the Hydrogen Bomb)
because they concluded:
[It was] necessary to have within the arsenal of the United States a
weapon of the greatest capability, in this case the super bomb. Such
a weapon would improve our defense in its broadest sense, as a
potential offensive weapon, a possible deterrent to war, a potential
retaliatory weapon, as well as a defensive weapon against enemy
forces.13 7

A silent premise of this doctrine is that the United States will not be the
first country to use its nuclear weapons.' 3 8 The popular perception then was
that a massive Soviet attack on U.S. cities and military installations would
justify a similarly massive attack on the Soviet Union. 19
The leading proponent of massive retaliation in the Eisenhower years,
General Curtis LeMay, remarked that such an attack would leave the Soviet
Union, a "burning, irradiating rubble."' LeMay argued for targeting large
military or industrial complexes within urban areas because even if the bombs
missed their precise targets, they would inflict what he called "bonus
damage."'
135. See SNOW, supra note 131, at 50 (discussing how the Russian explosion of an atomic
bomb caught the United States off guard and led to the first statement on nuclear policy, NSC68, a hastily drafted document that simply asserted United States nuclear superiority).
136. See Parrington, supra note 133; see also SHELDON M. COHEN, ARMS AND
JUDGMENT: LAW, MORALITY, AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 16672 (1989).
137. RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at 76 (quoting Memorandum by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) (1950), reprinted in 1 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1950: NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICY 503, 505 (Neal H. Petersen et al. eds., 1977).
138. RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at 81 ("McGeorge Bundy, the
national security advis[o]r to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson
stated. .. '[T]here has been literally no chance at all that any sane political authority . . would
consciously choose to start a nuclear war."'); see BORDEN, supra note 33, at 19-21.
139. John Foster Dulles, The Evolution ofForeignPolicy, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, Jan. 12,
1954, at 1.
140. RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at 84.
141. Id. at 80.
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LeMay and others urged the United States to prepare for and wage "total
war from the first hour of a conflict than allow it to drag on and consume more
lives."

42

Because they believed that is was impossible to defend the country

from nuclear attack, they argued for the development of an arsenal of
overwhelming strength and power designed to "kill more women and children
more quickly than the enemy." 43 Thus, LeMay established what he called his
"Sunday Punch": an assault strategy where the United States would develop
overwhelming and redundant nuclear weaponry and launch most of its
stockpile in its first attack.14 4 This would leave the Soviet Union "a smoking,
radiating ruin."14 5 LeMay could have said the same about the United States.
A significant number of nuclear strategists never accepted this notion,
however.'4 6 They always maintained that nuclear strategy should not be
geared to the all-out attack and response, the "wargasm" Herman Kahn called
it. ' Rather, United States nuclear policy must be geared to fight and to win
a nuclear war.148 Much of American nuclear production and deployment
through 1974 was a response to the arguments for a war fighting capacity.1 49
This policy began to evolve as the Cold War thawed and the security
environment changed. 5 0 The Soviet Union collapsed, China became more
powerful and independent, more countries acquired nuclear weapons, and the
threat of non-state terrorism loomed.' 5 ' Even before then, however, nuclear
strategists developed a war fighting alternative to mutually assured
destruction. Paul Nitze, an influential strategic thinker, urged the adoption of
a nuclear war posture that replicated the success of World War II's air
campaign in Europe.1 52 Treating nuclear weapons as simply larger, more
142. Id.
143. Id. at 80-81. Stanley Baldwin, the British Prime Minister after World War I, was
referring to the development of air power as a crucial element of defense strategy. Id. LeMay
paraphrased Baldwin when he remarked that stopping an air attack once launched would be
impossible and, therefore, the United States had to be prepared to retaliate in kind against any
such attack. Id.
144. Id. at 84.
145. Id.
146. 1956: EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 97-98 (Carole Fink et al. eds., 2006).
147. KAHN, METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS, supra note 32, at 194.
148. ToM SAUER, NUCLEAR INERTIA: US NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AFTER THE COLD
WAR 40 (2005).
149. INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 127 (Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. et
al. eds., 1981).
150. SAUER, supra note 148, at 40. See generally RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra
note 131; SNOw, supra note 131.
151. See COHEN, supra note 136, at 172 (implying that the Soviet Union became less of a
threat after the Cold War).
152. See RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at 103. Nitze went on to
participate in defense planning for the Truman Administration. Id. at 103-04.
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powerful conventional armaments, Nitze urged an initial focus on military
targets to clear the way for the bombing of the enemy's cities. 53 He dubbed
this a "counterforce" strategy in opposition to LeMay's "countervalue"
strategy." 5 4

It was not until 1974, however, that war fighting became the official
policy of this country when the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
announced the doctrine bearing his name. 5 I The Schlesinger doctrine
purported to give the President more nuclear options than simply destroying
enemy cities.'1

6

Rather, Schlesinger claimed that the new plan consisted of a

series of limited nuclear options which ranged from the destruction of a few
missile sites, cities, or industries to counterforce warfare-full-scale strikes at
Soviet military installations and the industries which support it.1" Schlesinger
also noted the ability to "implement response options that cause far less
civilian damage". 58The Carter Administration perfected the Schlesinger
doctrine in Presidential Directives NSC 50-59. 159 These documents went
beyond both the notion of selectivity to victory and the plan for management
of a protracted nuclear conflict.1 60 They provided justifications for
counterforce weapons as well as other measures designed to ensure that the
United States would prevail in a nuclear war. Indeed, the old term
counterforce was replaced by the word "countervailing" to signify the new
approach.' 6 Moreover, the directives provided for the use of nuclear weapons
in support of ground troops who survive an earlier nuclear exchange.1 62
American nuclear policy since the announcement of the Schlesinger
doctrine has followed its direction. Counterforce weapons system like the MX
missile and the B-i bomber; technical improvements like multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles and increased accuracy; and
defensive measures like the Strategic Defense Initiative and civil defense
plans were all part of the re-tooling of American nuclear doctrine from

153. Id. at 103.

154. Id.
155. JAMES SCHLESINGER, ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT 1, 3 (1974); see
COHEN, supra note 136, at 172.
156. SCHLESINGER, supra note 155, at 4.
157. See id. at 35-41.
158. Id. at 41.
159. See Carter Administration, Presidential Directives, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS,
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/index.html [https://penna.cc/GVL5-6M8A] (citing Presidential
Directives NSC-56 to NSC-59); see also RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 139, at
146.
160. See id. (citing Presidential Directives NSC-50 to NSC-59).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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deterrence to war fighting.' 6 3 The Reagan Administration never developed a
new strategic doctrine. Rather, its policies suggested an endorsement of the
war fighting notions enshrined in National Security Decision Memorandum
26. 164
Beginning with the Clinton Administration,1 65 presidents began to issue
periodic Nuclear Posture Reviews.' 66 The 1994 review kept deterrence as the
centerpiece of nuclear strategy but suggested that nuclear forces be reduced
to the minimum needed to maintain deterrence.16 In 1996, however, the
Clinton Administration suggested that the United States might use nuclear
weapons in response to a chemical attack.1 68 By 2002, the United States
expressly added the deterrence of the use of weapons of mass destruction by
nation states and terrorist organizations to its nuclear weapons policy.1 69
163. RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at 136-37, 157-58.

164. Id. at 168. For example, the Reagan Administration pursued the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), a proposed defense against nuclear attack that included, among other things,
space-based weapons. Id. at 243. Sadly, President Reagan's attachment to the SDI led to the
collapse of the Iceland talks with then Soviet Premier Gorbachev when the two leaders were on
the verge of agreeing to the total elimination of two countries' nuclear weapons. Id. at 236-70;
see also RICHARD RHODES, TWILIGHT OF THE BOMBS: RECENT CHALLENGES, NEW DANGERS,
AND THE PROSPECT FOR A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 4-5 (2010) (stating that
parties came close to agreement ridding the world of nuclear weapons but faltered over the
question of the SDI).
165. DEP'T OF DEF., NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW (1994); Michael Rubner, U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy in the Post Cold War Era, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT'L L. 271, 274 (2000)
(reviewing nuclear policy from the Clinton and the first Bush presidencies).
166. See Anna Pdczeli, The Next Nuclear Posture Review: Bring in State, Energy and
Allies, BULLETIN.ORG (Apr. 25, 2017), https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/the-next-nuclear-

posture-review-bring-in-state-energy-and-allies/
Congress
[https://penna.cc/8TZY-7X24].
mandated the reviews during the Bush and Obama Administrations. Id. Thus, they differ in
process, content, and scope from the Clinton and Trump reviews. In any event, these reviews
are designed to set out the country's nuclear policy and strategy for the next 5-10 years. Id.
President Trump ordered the Nuclear Posture Review as part of his Administration's effort to
"rebuild" the nation's armed forces. Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S. Armed
Forces, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 77 (Jan. 27, 2017).

167. Nuclear forces will be "smaller, safer, more secure, and maintained at lower alert
rates." DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 165, at 35.
168. Harold A. Feiveson & Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,
NONPROLIFERATION REV., Summer 2003, at 1, 1 ("Secretary of Defense William Perry said that
if the United States was attacked by chemical weapons, 'We could have a devastating response
without the use of nuclear weapons, but we would not forswear that possibility."').
169. Id. (citing National Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2150 (Dec. 11, 2002)). This had become clear as
early as February 2002. See John Simpson, The Role of Security Assurances in the Nuclear
NonproliferationRegime, in SECURITY ASSURANCES AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 71

(Jeffrey W. Knopf ed., 2012) (quoting Secretary of State Rick Boucher, "[i]f a weapon of mass
destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type
of military response"); see also The NationalSecurity Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica,
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These policies were "diplomatically disavowing the use of nuclear weapons
except in extreme circumstances and yet, at the same time, hedging the
disavowal to allow the greatest possible latitude for the use of nuclear
70
weapons."o
In addition, the 2002 review articulated nuclear war fighting as
a key component of the U.S. defense strategy.' 7 ' As Joseph Gerson noted:
The Bush [A]dministration has again put nuclear weapons-and
their various uses-at the center of U.S. military and foreign policy.
The message of the administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
in December 2001 was unmistakable. As The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists editorialized, "Not since the resurgence of the Cold War in
Ronald Reagan's first term has U.S. defense strategy placed such an
emphasis on nuclear weapons." The NPR reiterated the U.S.
commitment to first-strike nuclear war fighting. For the first time,
seven nations were specifically named as primary nuclear targets:
Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea. Consistent
with calls by senior administration figures who spoke of their "bias
in favor of things that might be usable," the NPR urged funding for
development of new and more usable nuclear weapons. This included
a new "bunker buster." Seventy times more powerful than the
Hiroshima A-bomb, the bunker buster was designed to destroy
enemy command bunkers and WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
installations buried hundreds of feet beneath the surface.1 72

WHITE
HOUSE
(2002),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nssall.html
[https://penna.cc/S6L6-YUYE] ("Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial
capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos
and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized
to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modem technologies against us. To defeat
this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal military power, better homeland
defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.").
170. Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 168; see also Michael Intriligator, US Nuclear
Weapons Policy Under the Bush Administration, WAGINGPEACE.ORG (July 25, 2004),
https://www.wagingpeace.org/us-nuclear-weapons-policy-under-the-bush-administration/
https://perma.cc/5HHIM-MWWC] (discussing the changes in nuclear strategy made by the
George H. W. Bush Administration).
171. Stephen Young & Lisbeth Gronlund, A Review of the 2002 US Nuclear Posture
Review 1 (Union of Concerned Scientists, Working Paper, May 14, 2002),
http://web.sungshin.ac.kr/-youngho/data/security/NPR-1(8Jan02).pdf [https://penna.cc/22N9U9EF].
172. Joseph Gerson, Empire and Nuclear Weapons, WAGINGPEACE.ORG (Dec. 5, 2007),
https://www.wagingpeace.org/empire-and-nuclear-weapons/ [https://penna.cc/BZ9G-5GLB].
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The Obama Administration's nuclear strategy largely followed that of its
predecessors even though it also pledged to abolish nuclear weapons.1 73
President Trump ordered a new Nuclear Posture Review as part of his
Administration's effort to "rebuild" the nation's armed forces.' 7 4 The Trump
Administration's goal was to "ensure that the United States nuclear deterrent
is modem, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter
21st-century threats and reassure our allies."

75

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review pushes the country in a different
direction from previous reviews.' 7 6 Gone is the Obama Administration call
for the abolition of nuclear weapons. 7 7 Instead, the Trump Administration
argues that "it is not possible to delay modernization of our nuclear forces if
we are to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent."

78

Flexibility is the cornerstone of the Trump Administration's policy on the
use of nuclear weapons.1 79 The review notes that this flexibility will allow the
President "to tailor the approach to deterring one or more potential adversaries
in different circumstances." 8 0 The Administration cites the increasing threat
from a newly empowered Russia, the changing security landscape, and the
latent threats from potential nuclear adversaries like Iran and North Korea.'s'
This changing environment demands that United States policy be tailored to
meet the known current threats and any unknown future threats.18 2
The review reaffirms traditional goals while at the same time expanding
the possible circumstances in which nuclear weapons may be used. It
reiterates traditional policies: to deter potential nuclear and non-nuclear
attacks, provide security assurance to our allies and partners, to achieve us
173. See

National

Security

Strategy,

WHITE

HOUSE

(2015),

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_nationalsecurity strategy
2.pdf [https://perna.cc/5RBG-CXTY]. But see Charles J. Moxley Jr., Obama 's Nuclear
Posture Review: An Ambitious Programfor Nuclear Arms Control but a Retreat from the
Objective of Nuclear Disarmament, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 734, 737 (2011) ("The nuclear

policy announced by the Obama NPR is thus inconsistent with the United States' obligation
under [the non-proliferation treaty] to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith."). See
generally Winston P. Nagen & Erin K. Slemmens, Developing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
and InternationalLaw: The Approach of the Obama Administration, 19 TUL. J. INTL. & COMP.

L. 41 (2010).
174. See Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces, supra note 166,
at 1.
175. Id. at 2.
176. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW, at VI (2018).

177. See Moxley, supra note 173, at 765.
178. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 176, at I.

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at II.
Id.
Id. at I.
See id. at II.
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goals if deterrence fails, and provide a hedge against an uncertain future. 83
The primary goal of U.S. nuclear forces is to ensure that "potential adversaries
do not miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first use, either
regionally or against the United States itself"'8

4

While the primary goal still is to deter potential nuclear adversaries from
using nuclear weapons, the complex security environment demands that
nuclear weapons play a role in other, complementary purposes. 8 5 The review
notes that effective nuclear deterrence requires "nuclear-armed adversaries
must recognize that their threats of nuclear escalation do not give them
freedom to pursue non-nuclear aggression."' 6 A full range of nuclear
capabilities is needed to create "the credible risk of intolerable consequences
for the adversary."i1?
The new posture moves well beyond the confines of mutually assured
destruction in the event of a strategic nuclear attack. I" Specifically,
the review rejects a no first use pledge:To help preserve deterrence
and the assurance of allies and partners, the United States gas never
adopted a "no first use" policy and, given the contemporary threat
environment, such a policy is not justified today. It remains the policy
of the United States to retain some ambiguity regarding the precise
circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. 189
In addition, the posture makes clear that the actions of non-state actors
and non-nuclear aggression might lead to the first use of nuclear weapons.
The Administration promised not to use nuclear weapons except in "extreme
circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and
183. Id. at VII.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("These roles are complementary and interrelated.").
186. Id. at 21.

187. Id.
188. 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-posture-review/ [https://perma.cc/4PSS-HG57]
("The Trump NPR perceives a rapidly deteriorating threat environment in which potential
nuclear-armed adversaries are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and follows suit. The
review reverses decades of bipartisan policy and orders what would be the first new nuclear
weapons since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the document expands the use of
circumstances in which the United States would consider employing nuclear weapons to include
'non-nuclear strategic attacks."'). But see Frank A. Rose, Is the 2018 Nuclear Posture as Bad
as Its Critics ClaimItIs?, BROOKINGS (Apr. 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-the2018-nuclear-posture-review-as-bad-as-the-critics-claim-it-is/ [https://perma.cc/3R3D-VKG4]
(arguing that the review does not break with previous United States policy but faces public
relations issues with its message).
189. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 176, at 22.
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Extreme circumstance could include "significant non-nuclear

strategic attacks," including "attacks on the U.S., allied or partner civilization
population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their
command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities."'91 The
review expressly includes a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States or its
allies as an extreme circumstance justifying the use of nuclear weapons. 192
In addition, the review discusses the need to build up the U.S. strategic
and tactical nuclear arsenal to deter current and future aggression. 193 In
particular, the review notes that Russia's capacity to and policy of threatening
the first use of nuclear weapons to gain an advantage in regional conflicts
seems premised on the calculation that the United States has neither the
capacity nor the will to respond with nuclear weapons. 194 The review posits
that, without a flexible and tailored nuclear policy, a nuclear state like Russia
might gamble that the United States would not unleash a strategic response to
their use of a tactical weapon. 195 This could lead to settlement of these
conflicts on terms favorable to our adversarieS. 196 Thus, the posture notes that
the United States must ensure that Russia "does not miscalculate regarding
the consequences of limited nuclear first use, either regionally or against the
United States."i 97 Russian first use, regardless of scale, will "fundamentally
alter the conflict, and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for
Moscow."l 98

Any use of nuclear weapons would follow an unspecified "deliberative
process."

99

Still, the United States will keep "a portion of its nuclear forces

on alert day-to-day, and retain the option of launching them promptly." 200
According to the review, the missiles are not on "hair-trigger alert."20 1 Rather,
190. Id at 21.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 67-68 ("The United States will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group,
or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear
devices . . a terrorist nuclear attack against the United States or its allies or partners would
qualify as an 'extreme circumstance' under which the United States could consider the ultimate
form of retaliation.").
193. Id. at 27 ("This need for flexibility to tailor U.S. capabilities and strategies to meet
future and unanticipated developments runs contrary to a rigid, continuing policy of 'no new
nuclear capabilities."').
194. See id. at 30.
195. Id. at 30-31.
196. This is the "escalate to de-escalate" doctrine. Id. at 30.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 22. However, that process seemingly does not include Congress as is shown by
the alert system being subject to military and civilian control.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 22.
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the alert system is "highly stable" and "subject to multiple layers" of civilian
and Presidential control. 20 2 Finally, the review notes:
All U.S. presidents since 1945 have considered U.S. employment of
nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances and for defensive
purposes . . [The use of nuclear weapons] would adhere to the law
of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The
United States will strive to end any conflict and restore deterrence at
the lowest level of damage possible for the United States, allies, and
partners, and minimize civilian damage to the extent possible
consistent with achieving objectives. 203
IV. NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The changing security landscape and the consequent change in our
nuclear strategy makes congressional involvement more necessary than ever.
The most recent Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that the President can
use nuclear weapons under an increasing number of circumstances. 204 Unlike
the popular conception the United States will wait until the bombs are falling
to deploy nuclear weapons, the posture makes clear that the President can use
weapons even when the United States has not been attacked and even when
those attacks are not nuclear. 205
Congress delegated the authority to use nuclear weapons to the President
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.206 In the process of setting up the Atomic
Energy Commission, Congress said:

202. Id. But see ERIC SCHLOSSER, COMMAND AND CONTROL: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE
DAMASCUS INCIDENT, AND THE ILLUSION OF SAFETY (2013) (detailing incidents where control

&

system failed, almost resulting in a nuclear attack, focusing on an accident in Arkansas); see
also RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at 165-66 (describing a NATO military
exercise in 1983 that caused the Soviet Union to come within minutes of ordering nuclear attack:
"[T]he United States and the Soviet Union, apes on a treadmill, inadvertently blundered close to
nuclear war in November 1983.").
203. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 176, at 23.
204. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 176, at 21. But see Michaela Dodge
Denitsa Nikolova, 5 Myths About the Nuclear Posture Review, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 2,
2018),
https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/5-myths-about-the-nuclearposture-review [https://perma.cc/5KRA-MJJE].
205. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 176, at 21 (describing non-nuclear
attacks that could constitute "extreme circumstances," thus warranting a nuclear response).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2121(b) (2012); see RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at
78 (noting that the act was designed to take control of the weapons from the military and lodge
control of them with the civilian President and quoting President Truman saying that he didn't
want a "dashing lieutenant colonel decid[ing] when would be the proper time to drop one").
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The President from time to time may direct the Commission (1) to
deliver such quantities of . .. atomic weapons to the Department of
Defense for such use as he deems necessary in the interests of
national defense or (2) to authorize any atomic weapons . . . for
military purposes.207

Mutually assured destruction may have held the few nuclear states at
bay. 208 Neither side (and there were only two sides during the Cold War)
would be willing to risk total destruction from strategic nuclear weapons. 209
As the members of the nuclear club grew, shifting alliances and national
jealousies took the advantage from the United States. 210
The security environment has become even more complex. The advent of
tactical warheads, dirty bombs, and global terrorism, nuclear weapons greatly
complicate the nuclear calculus. 211 The threat of nuclear terrorism made
mutually assured destructions look even more anachronistic. 212 Nuclear
weapons can now more easily be seen as "like other munitions."21 3 Nuclear
war, at least of a limited nature, is now possible 214 and, indeed, contemplated
by the U.S. national security policy. 215
207. 42 U.S.C § 2121(b). Arguably, this only delegates to the President the power to
control the production of nuclear weapons or their designation as weapons. Under this reading,
the statute did not disturb the constitutional process for getting the nation into war. See, e.g.,
Peter Raven-Hansen, Nuclear War Powers, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 786, 792-93 (1989) (arguing the
War Powers Resolution may require additional specific delegation to use nuclear weapons to the
President beyond the broad wording of the resolution). But see H. Bartholomew Cox, Raison
d'etat and World Survival: Who ConstitutionallyMakes Nuclear War?, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1614, 1621-28 (1989) (arguing that the statute gives unfettered discretion over the use of nuclear
weapons to the president and, therefore, is an unconstitutional delegation of power).
208. See SNOW, supra note 131, at 204-42.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 176, at V.
212. The existence of weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation raise serious
doubts about preventive and preemptive measures. See generally EDWARD KEYNES,
UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 166-67 (1982).
213. See generally NINA TANNENWALD, THE NUCLEAR TABOO: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1945, at 252 (2007) (referencing the policy
under the Eisenhower administration that nuclear weapons were "like other munitions," a term
used in William Burr's essay US NuclearHistory: NuclearArms andPolitics in the Missile Age
1955-1968); RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 131, at 103 (nuclear strategist Paul

Nitze concluded that nuclear weapons "compressed the explosive power of many conventional
weapons into one").
214. Raven-Hansen, supra note 207, at 788 (observing the most likely use of nuclear
weapons is in the escalation of a conventional war in Europe).
215. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 176, at 66 (observing that nuclear
terrorism would be met with a nuclear response).
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This vastly more complicated scenanio requires that the status quo in
regard to the use of nuclear weapons, especially their first use, be examined.
The Framers' vision of congressional primacy in war making is now so
obscured as to be unrecognizable. 216 The current policy of the United States
eliminates the Legislative branch from any role in deciding if and when the
country goes to nuclear war. 217 At a minimum, we must restore some of the
original constitutional balance between the Executive and Congress. 218 To
explore this question, the following Sections will begin with the Framers'
understanding of the war making process and then apply those ideas in the
context of nuclear strategy. 219
V.

HISTORY OF THE WAR POWER

To say that the Framers did not foresee nuclear weapons is to say very
little. 220 The Framers did not anticipate television either, but courts have not

hesitated to extend the First Amendment to the electronic media. 221 The
critical issue is whether the principles the Framers placed in the Constitution

&

216. See Michael J. Garcia, A Necessary Response: The Lack of Domestic and
InternationalConstraintsupon a U.S. Nuclear Response to a TerroristAttack, 1 GEO. J.L.
PUB. POL'Y 515, 523 (2003) ("[T]he President would likely face few domestic legal restraints
by Congress or the courts if he decided to use nuclear weapons in the face of a substantial
terrorist attack. If the United States were attacked and the President wished to use nuclear force,
Congress would have few means by which to pose an effective challenge to the President's
decision and might be unlikely to do so for political reasons as well.").
217. Raven-Hansen, supra note 207, at 786-87. Professor Raven-Hansen argued that
"[t]he development of nuclear weapons has turned [the original constitutional] framework on its
head." The battle plan will take place almost by itself due to the overlapping systems of prepositioning, executive delegation and the weapons "vast destructive potential and speed of
delivery .... Congress is thus unlikely to have any control 'the day after."' Id.
218. Id. at 795 ("Congress has surely been in equal measure uninterested, uninformed and
unduly dependent on the Executive in the control and planning of nuclear war. Perhaps questions
about the existence of the presidential war power will help recall the first branch to the more
critical question of its wise use.").
219. See infra notes 418-66. Here, I will borrow the contextual analysis from Professor
Bums Weston. Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus InternationalLaw: A Contextual
Reassessment, 28 MCGLL L.J. 542 (1983); see also BURNS H. WESTON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION (1989).

220. See Cox, supra note 207, at 1621 ("To search for the intentions of the founding fathers
in such a case is speculative, if not mischievous, because they obviously did not think of nuclear
weapons.").
221. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Burstynv. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
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have any application to the specific problems presented by nuclear
weapons.222
Revolutionary era Americans feared executive power.223 Edward Corwin,
the noted presidential scholar, remarked "that 'the executive magistracy' was
the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural friend of Liberty." 224
Thus, the Articles of Confederation 225 did not provide for an Executive. 226
Congress retained both legislative and executive powers. 227 The first
Executive officers were congressional creations. 228
The arrangement did not work well. State legislatures did not prove to be
"guardians of Liberty." 229 Regional jealousies, state adventures in foreign
affairs, and the general inefficiencies of the Articles led to "growing
apprehension as the Congress found itself incapable of discharging its duties
and responsibilities. Support began to grow for an independent executive." 23 0
Informed by these concerns, the delegates who gathered in Philadelphia
in 1787 agreed on the need to create an executive department but little else
about it. 231 This divergence of opinion meant that the Convention had to
devote its attention to basic questions about the Executive: "[W]ould it be
single or plural, act with or without a council, have veto power, how would it
be chosen, for what term and with what possibility of re-election." 23 2 Article
222. See, e.g., KEYNES, supra note 212, at 33 (reasoning that the Framers' deliberate
ambiguity requires a generous interpretation of their words).
223. See KEYNES, supra note 212, at 17 (discussing early ideas about separation of powers
providing "defenses against tyranny"). For a discussion of the royal prerogatives that influenced
the Framers, see Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 259,

271-83 (2009).
224. CORWIN, OFFICE AND POWERS, supra note 50, at 4.
225. See generally Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation
as a Sourcefor Determiningthe OriginalMeaning of the Constitution, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

397 (2017) (showing strengths and weakness of claims through Supreme Court decisions
relating to the original meaning of the Constitution, which rely, at least in part, on the Articles
of Confederation).
226. KEYNES, supra note 212, at 28 (observing the failure to provide an executive was not
viewed as a fatal flaw in the Articles of Confederation).
227. See id. at 25-26.

228. Id. at 25.
229. See RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. SUPREME COURT 10-11 (1969); see also
KEYNES, supra note 212, at 18 (describing Jefferson's reference to "legislative despotism" in
the state legislatures).
230. FISHER, supra note 5, at 12; see also KEYNES, supra note 212, at 29.
231. See KEYNES, supra note 212, at 29 ("[C]reation of a unitary executive with
independent tenure who shared limited power over war and foreign affairs with Congress
reflected the Framers' general fear of governmental power and their particular fear of
prerogative.").
232. W.

TAYLOR REVELEY,

III, WAR POWERS

OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

59, 72

(1981).
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II reflects this structural focus. The Convention rarely addressed issues of
presidential power, either as to source or as to scope.
Several concerns motivated the Framers in their approach to the war
powers of the proposed new government.233 Under the Articles of
Confederation, Congress had the "sole and exclusive right and power of
determining on peace and war" as well as the power of "making rules for the
government and regulation of the . .. land and naval forces, and for directing
their operations." 234 At the same time, the Articles gave Congress extensive
control over the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal but reserved some
authority for states to issue such after a congressional "declaration of war." 235
The drafters of the Articles did not need to be precise with their terminology
because in any event the only institution of government given any power
under the Articles was the Congress. 23 6 More important was the power of
Congress to direct the armed forces. Unlike the Constitution that splits the war
declaring function from the war making function, the Articles joined these
powers in one Congress. 237

To a large extent, the creation of a powerful legislature reflected the
colonists' fear of executive control. As Edward Corwin put it, America was
no longer a colony when it saw "the 'executive magistracy' as the natural
enemy, the legislative assembly the natural friend of liberty."

23 8

Post-

revolution state constitutions reflected this fear which created legislatures
with great powers and executives with narrow, tightly defined powers. 23 9 The
state experience with powerful legislatures was not entirely satisfactory. 240 By
1787, the tyrannical excesses of the state assemblies had sobered the Framers
on the wisdom of a single dominant branch of government.241 In spite of the
lingering suspicion of executive power and a lingering faith in elected

233. See generallyKEYNES, supra note 212.
234. Id. at 25.
235. See id. at 25-26.
236. Id. at 17 ("The Articles of Confederation . . completely ignored both the separation
of powers and checks and balances.").
237. Id. at 34. Of course, the Confederation Congress was limited by the constraints placed
on its power to impose taxes, spend money, authorize military action, and raise armies. Id. at
25-26; see FISHER, supra note 5, at 12-13.
238. CORWIN, OFFICE AND POWERS, supra note 50, at 5-6.

239. KEYNES, supra note 212, at 17-18.
240. See KEYNES, supra note 212, at 18; Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory
Interpretation,74 N.C. L. REv. 585, 647-53 (1996).
241. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in l ITHE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
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assemblies, the Framers approached the Constitutional Convention more
disposed toward executive power than before.242
Inefficiencies under the Articles bolstered this disposition further. 243
Even though Article 9 gave Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power
of determining on peace and war . .. entering into treaties and alliances . . . of
granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace,"244 each of these
grants of power were limited by accompanying conditions on their exercise or
their scope. 245
Accordingly, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress found it
increasingly difficult to conduct foreign affairs. 246 Article IX stated that:
The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war,
nor grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into
any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value
thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the
defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit
bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor
appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war, to
be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised,
nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy, unless nine
States assent to the same: nor shall a question on any other point,
except for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless by the
votes of the majority of the United States in Congress assembled.247
Requiring a supermajority allowed small states blocked action.248 Ad hoc
committees designed to conduct aspects of foreign affairs degenerated into
regional bickering. 249 Individual states conducted their own foreign
ventures. 250 Alexander Hamilton called it "a system so radically vicious and

242. CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMEs L. COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 218 (1986).
243. See id. at 228-33.

244. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
245. Article VI reserved the right of state self-defense until Congress could assemble,
prohibited any treaties that restricted the States' ability to impose import or export tariffs on any
commodity, and limited letters of marque and reprisal to times of war. Id. art. VI, paras. 1, 3, 5.
246. Id.
247. Id. art. IX, para. 6.
248. See KEYNES, supra note 212, at 26.
249. Id.
250. See COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 242, at 6; KEYNES, supra note 212, at 27.
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unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its leading
features and characters."

25

1

From today's perspective, we view the question of the war making power
as an inter-branch matter. 252 We seek the answer in the entrails of the proper

distribution of power between the President and Congress. 253 The Framers,
however, saw the problem in Federalism terms: how to structure the federal
government so it can effectively carry out the Union's war and peace functions
without entirely crushing state authority. 254 Thus, the little debate on the war
powers of the federal government at the convention, thereafter, centered
primarily on the power of the federal government versus the states, as opposed
to the distribution of the war and peace powers among the several branches of
the federal government.255
This concern was two-sided.256 During the Confederation, the diplomatic
activity of some individual states was a cause for concern. 257 As Edward
Keynes put it, "he Articles of Confederation established an organization of
thirteen states, but a fourteenth state, the United States, did not exist because
the states retained their sovereignty." 258 This led James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton to raise the specter of disunity inviting foreign
aggression.259 George Washington noted:
I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation, without having lodged
somewhere a power which will pervade the whole Union in as
energetic a manner, as the authority of the different state governments
251. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
252. See HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 205-06 (1990).
253. See REVELEY, supra note 232, at 71-72; see also FISHER, supra note 5, at 10-11, 2526; David J. Barron & Martin S. Ledennan, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 786

(2008) ("[W]hen it came to questions of the military and foreign relations, the delegates were
far more consumed by discussions of the relative powers of the federal and state governments
than by the allocation of such powers within the federal system.").
254. KEYNES, supra note 212, at 18-19. See generally COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note
242, at 241-58 (describing the events and discussions leading up to how the Framers established
the balance of powers underlying the principles of federalism).
255. WilliamP. Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59 CALIF. L. REV.
1194, 1197-98 (1971).
256. See id.
257. See COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 242, at 9; see also KEYNES, supra note 212, at
27 (outlining Virginia's treaty with France, its loan from Spain, and its use of armaments as
collateral; also mentioning other states that "laid embargoes, fitted out navies, authorized
privateers, drafted armies, and negotiated with the Indian tribes").
258. KEYNES, supra note 212, at 27.
259. W. Taylor Reveley, III, ConstitutionalAllocation of the War Powers Between the
Presidentand Congress: 1787-1788, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 73, 76-77 (1974).
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extends over the several States. To be fearful of vesting Congress,
constituted as that body is, with ample authorities for national
purposes, appears to me the very climax of popular absurdity and
madness.... Many are of opinion that Congress have too frequently
made use of the suppliant humble tone of requisition, in applications
to the States, when they had a right to assume their imperial dignity
and command obedience. Be that as it may, requisitions are a perfect
nihility, where thirteen sovereign, independent disunited States are in
the habit of discussing [and] refusing compliance with them at their
option. Requisitions are actually little better than a jest and a bye
word through out the Land. If you tell the Legislatures they have
violated the treaty of peace and invaded the prerogatives of the
confederacy they will laugh in your face.

. .

. Things cannot go on in

the same train forever.
It is much to be feared, as you observe, that the better kind of
people being disgusted with the circumstances will have their minds
prepared for any revolution whatever. We are apt to run from one
extreme into another. To anticipate [and] prevent disastrous
contingencies would be the part of wisdom [and] patriotism. 260

At the same time, the Framers and their contemporaries generally feared
a centralized government in possession of a standing army. 26 1 This concern
for Federalism has largely vanished from modem consideration of the war and
peace powers. 262 These concerns prompted the Framers assembled in
Philadelphia in May 1787 to amend the Articles of Confederation.263 Quickly,
however, they re-defined their task from amendment to restructuring. 264
They said little on war and peace issues until later in the summer.265 The
early comments show a fear of lodging unlimited war powers, peace powers,
or both in the President. 266 During a debate about whether the executive
should be one or several persons, Charles Pinckney, John Rutledge, and James
Wilson expressed similar sentiments against giving the executive war and
260. Letter from George

Washington to John Jay

(Aug.

15,

1786),

in THE

CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 207, 208-09 (Henry P. Johnston ed., Da

Capo Press 1971) (1891).
261. Reveley, supra note 259, at 92-93.
262. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 43, at 70.
263. Reveley, supra note 259, at 94-95.
264. See id. at 95.
265. Id. at 95, 103.
266. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 3 THE
FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 96 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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peace powers. 267 Pinckney feared that these powers would make the
presidency "a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one," 268 while
Rutledge and Wilson expressed the less sanguine notion that the power of war
and peace were "of a Legislative nature." 269 Madison agreed with both
Wilson's delineation of executive and legislative powers and Pinckney's
characterization of an elected monarch, added that any powers given to the
executive should be "confined and defined."

270

The Convention made little progress on the war, peace question until
August.271 At that time, the Convention dispatched the Committee of Detail

to put the finishing touches on a draft constitution. 272 On August 6th, the
Committee, through John Rutledge, reported to the Convention. 273 The
Committee gave the Legislature the power "to make war." 274 In addition, it
gave the Legislature the powers:
To make rules concerning captures on land and water; [t]o declare
the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas . . . and of offenses against the law of nations; [t]o subdue

a rebellion in any State, on the application in any state, on the
application of its legislature; .. . [t]o raise armies; [t]o build and equip
fleets; [t]o call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws

267. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 1, 1787), in 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64, 65 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS]; MadisonDebates June 1, AVALON PROJECT: DOCUMENTS

L., HIST. & DIPL., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/_18th century/debates_601.asp; see John C. Yoo,
The Continuation ofPoliticsby Other Means: The Original Understandingof War Powers, 84

CALIF. L. REV. 167, 258 (1996).
268. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 45

(Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES]; Madison Debates June 1, supra
note 267.
269. Madison, supra note 267; Madison Debates June 1, supra note 267; see also Yoo,
supra note 267, at 258 (describing the concerns of James Wilson and Charles Pinkney of
adopting the English division of powers).
270. Rufus King, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 1, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 267, at 70, 70 (James Madison); Powers ofthe Executive, [1 June] 1787,
NAT'L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/0110-02-0011 [https://penna.cc/N7S7-ZWHT].
271. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 268, at 389.
272. See Yoo, supra note 267, at 258-59.
273. James Madison, Journal (Aug. 6, 1987), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 267,
at 176; Madison Debates August 6, AVALON PROJECT: DOCUMENTS L., HIST. & DIPL.,

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/debates_806.asp [https://perma.cc/9TGW-KXW3].
274. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 267, at 177, 182.
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of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions .... "275
The Committee also proposed creating an executive who "shall be
[C]ommander in [C]hief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the Militia of the several States." 276
The Convention considered each clause of the Constitution in turn. 277 On

August 17, they reached the "make war" clause. 278 The question before the
Convention was whether to substitute "declare" for "make." 279 The debate
was remarkably short; Madison's notes on it take up barely more than a page
and a half 280
Pinckney opposed giving the power to the whole Legislature.281 Rather,
he favored giving it to the Senate, "being more acquainted with foreign affairs,
and most capable of proper resolutions."

28 2

Pierce Butler responded that the

Senate had the same infirmities as the whole Legislature. 283 "He was for
vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities,
and will not make war but when the nation will support it."

28 4

None of the other delegates showed Butler's faith in executive restraint. 285
Eldridge Gerry remarked that he never expected to hear in a republic "a
motion to empower the Executive alone to make war." 28 6 George Mason was
"[against] giving the power of war to the Executive, because not (safely) to be
trusted with it." 28 7 Madison and Gerry moved to substitute "declare" for

"make," which left the Executive with the power to "repel sudden attacks." 288

275. Madison, supra note 274.
276. Madison, supra note 274.
277. Clara S. Foltz, Constitution-Maker,66 IND. L.J. 849, 895 (1991).
278. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 268, at 472-76.
279. Reveley, supra note 259, at 103-04.
280. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 17, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 267, at 314, 318-19; Madison Debates August 17, AvALON
PROJECT: DOCUMENTS L., HIST. & DIPL., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/debates_8

17.asp [https://perna.cc/W649-XH8A].
281. Madison, supra note 280.
282. Id. at 318 (Charles Pinkney).
283. Id.; see also Reveley, supra note 259, at 104 (describing how Pierce Butler's

statements advanced the arguments of Charles Pinckney one step further).
284. Madison, supra note 280, at 318 (Pierce Butler).
285. Id. at 319.
286. Id.
287. Id.; see also WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 91, at 18 (noting that George Mason
spoke in favor of facilitating peace, not war).
288. Madison, supra note 280, at 318.
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Roger Sherman seemed to speak against the motion.289 He favored leaving the
language as it was because the proposed substitution narrowed what he saw
as the already existing power of the President to "repel and not to commence
war." 290
Oliver Ellsworth spoke of the difference between war and peace. 291 He
wanted to make it easier to get into war than out of it because "[w]ar . .. is a
simple and overt declaration [while] peace [is] attended with intricate & secret
[negotiations]." 292 Mason spoke against the Ellsworth notion.293 Mason was in
favor of "clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace." 294
He favored the substitution of "declare."

295

At this point, the Convention voted on the motion. Madison's records
diverge from the official journal.296 Madison records one vote, initially seven
for, two against, and one absent.297 The journal, however, shows a vote four
in favor and five against.298 Madison noted that after his sole recorded vote,

Rufus King remarked "that 'make war' might be understood to 'conduct' it
which was an Executive function." 299 King's remark apparently satisfied any
concerns Ellsworth had to the motion, as Madison says, "Mr. Ellsworth gave
up his objection (and the vote of [Connecticut] was changed to-ay.)" 300
The journal shows that a second vote on the motion was taken. 301 This
time the vote was eight to one-the same tally as Madison's second vote.302

289. Id.
290. Id. at 318 (Roger Sherman); see also SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL C. NELSON,
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1776-2011, at 45 (6th ed. 2011).
291. Madison, supra note 280, at 319.
292. Id. at 319 (Oliver Ellsworth).
293. Id; see also Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President, and the Power to Wage
War, 48 CHI-KENT L. REV.

131

(1971) (citing NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL

CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 475-76 (Ohio Univ. Press ed. 1966)).
294. Madison, supra note 280, at 319.
295. Id.
296. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 266; see also LOUIS
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 6 (3rd ed. rev. 2013).

297. Madison, supra note 280, at 319.
298. 1 THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 246 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, D.C., 1836) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES].

299. Madison, supra note 280, at 319; see also Reveley, supra note 259, at 106 (detailing
the dropped objection by Oliver Ellsworth following Rufus King's comment of to "make" war
being understood as to "conduct" war).
300. Madison, supra note 280, at 319; see also Reveley, supra note 259, at 106 n.103
(providing James Madison's textual note, which stated Rufus King's comment and Oliver
Ellsworth's dropped objection).
301. See 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 298, at 246.
302. Id.
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Some other maneuvering occurred.3 03 Pinckney unsuccessfully tried to strike
the entirety of the declare war clause.3 04 Butler moved to give "the Legislature
the power of peace, as they were to have that of war." 3 05 Seconding the
motion, Gerry noted that as few as eight senators could "exercise the power if
vested in that body, and . . may consequently give up part of the [United]
States." 306 h spite of these arguments, the motion failed to gain even one
affirmative vote.3 07 The Convention then adjourned for the day. 308 It did not
return to the declaration clause.3 09
The literature on this debate is extensive but a fair consensus on several
points has emerged among the commentators. The majority of scholars
concede that the Framers intended to give Congress, and not the President, the
power to initiate the use of the armed forces.3 10 Indeed, this principle seemed
self-evident among the Framers. 31' Charles Lofgren notes that the Committee
303. Id. at 246-47.
304. Madison, supra note 280, at 319; see also Reveley, supra note 259, at 108 (noting
that Charles Pinckney's effort to strike the declare war clause failed without any recorded
argument).
305. Madison, supra note 280, at 319.
306. Id.
307. Madison, supra note 280, at 319; see also KEYNES, supra note 212, at 36-37
(detailing the events and discussions that led to the unanimous vote).
308. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 266.
309. See id.
310. See, e.g., LOuIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 75-76 (2d ed. 1996); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 75 (1990) [hereinafter
KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION]; Leonard G. Ratner, The CoordinatedWarmaking
Power: Legislative, Executive andJudicialRoles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 465 (1970); William
Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972); see also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993); FISHER, supra note 5,
at 293; FISHER, supra note 296, at 4 ("On numerous occasions the delegates to the constitutional
convention emphasized that the power of peace and war associated with monarchy would not
be given to the President."); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 72-73
(1990); WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 91, at 52; David Gray Adler, The President's WarMaking Power, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 119, 140-41 (Thomas E. Cronin
ed., 1989); Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO Go TO WAR 28, 30 (Gary M. Stem & Morton H. Halperin
eds., 1994); John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1386 (1988); Louis Fisher, Unchecked PresidentialWars, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1637, 1637 (2000); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1297 (1988); Jane E.
Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the UnitedNations, 81 GEO.
L.J. 597, 597 (1993).
311. See CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR THE 108TH CONGRESS 110 (2003); KOH, supra note 310, at 75-76; Reveley, supra note
259, at 96-97.
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on Detail "had little trouble in allocating the war-making power." 3 12 "Clearly,
as the committee sensed the will of the Convention on these points-points
which, it must be remembered, had scarcely been debated-war making fell
almost automatically to Congress."3 13

The ratifying conventions also interpreted the war powers of Congress
broadly. 314 Reveley concluded that "the Ratifiers generally equated Congress'
power to declare war under the Constitution with its power to determine on
war under the Articles of Confederation." 315 Robert Livingston stated that the
powers of the Confederation Congress and the new Congress were "the very
same . . [including] the power of making war." 316
James Wilson argued that the new Constitution would not "hurry us into
war . . [because] the important power of declaring war is vested in the
legislature at large: this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the
House of Representative." 317 Like the Philadelphia convention, the ratifying
conventions engaged in little debate over the declaration of war clause. 318 This
"modest inattention . .. appears to have stemmed from the unanimous
expectation that it left the President no independent war-making authority." 319
Only Pierce Butler, at the South Carolina Convention, spoke on the
declaration clause issue. 320 Butler recounted for the delegates his recollections
of the debate surrounding the substitution of "declare" for "make." 321 He said
the Convention at first proposed:
[T]o vest the sole power of making peace or war in the Senate; but
this was objected to as inimical to the genius of a republic, by
destroying the necessary balance they were anxious to preserve.
Some gentlemen were inclined to give this power to the President;
but it was objected to as throwing into his hands the influence of a
312. Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The
Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 679 (1972).

Original

313. Id.
314. Reveley, supra note 259, at 123-28; see also Cameron 0. Kisiter, The AntiFederalistsand PresidentialWar Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 459, 467 (2011) (concluding that the
anti-federalist position provides support for congressional primacy).
315. Reveley, supra note 259, at 126.
316. Lofgren, supra note 312, at 685.
317. The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 298, at 528.
318. Id.
319. Reveley, supra note 259, at 127.
320. CATO INST., supra note 311, at 512.
321. Debates in the Legislature and in Convention of the State of South Carolina, on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 298,
at 263.
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monarch, having an opportunity of involving his country in a war
whenever he wished to promote her destruction. The House of
Representatives was then named; but an insurmountable objection
was made to this proposition-which was, that negotiations always
required the greatest secrecy, which could not be expected in a large
body. 322

In the Federalist No. 41, Madison seems to argue that the power to declare
war is inherent. 323 He listed the declaration clause as a power to provide
"[s]ecurity against foreign danger," 324 and then added: "Is the power of
declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It
would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The
existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form." 325

Madison was most concerned about quelling state fears of a centralized
war power.326 He saw the necessity of placing the power with the federal
government: "Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects
of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union.
The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal
councils."

327

Thus the power to declare war, to raise armies, to grant letters of marque
and reprisal, to regulate and call out the militia, and to tax are necessary
concomitants of the Union's "impulse of self-preservation." 328 The
Constitution attempted to limit military establishments without impairing
their effectiveness. 329 With these safeguards, Madison argued for the absolute
330
necessity of broad war powers.

Madison's comments ignored the distribution of power between the
Congress and the Executive. 331 Like others, he seemed to think that the
Constitution left the Congress with the power to make war.332

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
THE FEDERALIST

NO. 41 (James Madison).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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The breadth of congressional war making powers was also suggested by
the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal.333 These were species of
private warfare in which governments would grant authority to private
individuals to carry out hostilities. 33 4 Although the Confederation Congress
possessed the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, their use for the
peacetime satisfaction of the private claims had fallen into disuse.33 5 It could

be argued that the inclusion of this power was careless oversight in that the
practice was obsolete by the time of the Convention.33 6
Professor Lofgren, however, rejects that interpretation.33 7 He believed
that the clause "could easily have been interpreted [by its authors and their
contemporaries] . . . as a kind of shorthand for vesting in Congress the power

of general reprisal outside the context of declared war." 338 Although this
interpretation is not without doubt, it comports with the late eighteenth
century understanding of perfect and imperfect wars.33 9 Declared wars were
"perfect" while undeclared wars were "imperfect." 3 40 Imperfect wars
occurred "where a certain violent protection of our rights is necessary," with
the violence consisting of state-authorized private reprisals directed at
property held by the subjects of another nation.3 41 Imperfect wars could lead
to perfect wars.3 42

333. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and ForeignAffairs: Practice Under
the Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 27 (1976); see also C. Kevin Marshall, Putting
Privateers in Their Place: The Applicability of Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared
Wars, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 953 (1997).
334. See Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and
ForgottenPower, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (1986).
335. Id.
336. See William Young, A Check on Faint-HeartedPresidents: Letters ofMarque and
Reprisal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 895, 905 (2009).
337. Lofgren, supra note 312, at 693-97.
338. Id. at 696.
339. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 310, at 77-78; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, Jr., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 21 (2004). But see Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases-andTheir
Relevance to Whether "Letters ofMarque andReprisal" Constrain Presidential War Powers,
28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465, 467 (2005) ("As usedby legal scholars when the Constitution

was drafted, these words had meanings that were both well understood and not dependent upon
the allocation of war-making power between the legislative and executive branches.").
340. War power, BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (Legal Assistant ed. 1994). See
generally KEYNES, supra note 212, at 20-23 (arguing the Executive must follow congressional
consent within the context of an ambiguous division between Congress's and the Executive's
powers).
341. Lofgren, supra note 312, at 692.
342. Daniel J. Hessel, Founding-Era Jus Ad Bellum and the Domestic Law of Treaty
Withdrawal, 125 YALE L.J. 2394, 2426 (2016).
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Lofgren concluded that the power over marque and reprisals would have
given increased plausibility to the view that Congress possessed whatever
war-commencing power was not covered by the phrase "to declare war."3 43
Thus, a late eighteenth century American could reasonably believe "that the
Constitution vested Congress with control over the commencement of war,
whether declared or undeclared." 3

44

While granting Congress broad powers, the Framers made a sharp
distinction between the power to commence war and the power to conduct it
once begun. 45 Whereas Congress was given the power to put the country into
a state of war, once it did so, the responsibility of conducting the war fell to
the President.3 46 Thus, from the beginning, the Convention agreed that the
President would be the Commander in Chief. 34 Like the declaration clause,
the Commander in Chief Clause received little attention.3 48 Most of the state

constitutions in effect at that time created a similar power in the state
governor.3 49 There was distrust for unchecked executive authority. As
Professors Barron and Lederman noted:
[N]ot a single one of the new state constitutions expressly conferred
such preclusive authority, nor did any of them suggest that the
legislative branch would be prevented from interfering with the
Commander in Chiefs conduct of military operations. Moreover,
five of them-including the Massachusetts Constitution, which likely
was the primary model for the federal Commander in Chief Clause
in 1787-stated expressly that the governor would have to exercise
his military powers in conformity with state law3 50

343. Lofgren, supra note 312, at 697; see also KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION,
supra note 310, at 76-77; Hessel, supra note 342, at 2420; Ratner, supra note 310, at 465; Van
Alstyne, supra note 310, at 18-19 (arguing Congress alone has the power to engage in war).
344.
Law: The
345.
346.

Lofgren, supra note 312, at 697. But see Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad
War PowersAct, 50 TEx. L. REv. 833, 850-51 (1972).
Reveley, supra note 259, at 93.
See also Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers Debate: A Reply

to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685, 1703-04 (2002) (arguing that the Articles of
Confederation understood the commander in chief power relating to the chain of command and
not to using military to start war).
347. See REVELEY, supra note 232, at 58.
348. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 780.
349. Id. at 781 ("Ten of the new state constitutions designated the state's highest executive
officer usually but not always denominated the Governor as the Commander in Chief of the
state militia.").
350. Id. at 782.
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The Convention's first proposal on this subject, the New Jersey Plan,
specifically prohibited the Executive to "take command of any troops, so as
personally to conduct any enterprise as General . . . ."351 Hamilton's plan
authorized the executive to "have the direction of the war when authorized or
begun." 3 52 Earlier, Pierce Butler and Eldridge Gerry supported a single
executive because of the efficiency he would have in directing combat.3 53
Butler said that his support for a single executive was forged by "seeing the
manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland when
threatened with invasion"; while Gerry thought it would be "extremely
inconvenient" to have multiple executives, "particularly in military
matters ... It would be a general with three heads."3 54
From these few references, the Convention adopted the brief Commander
in Chief power without discussion. 355 The phrase first appeared on May 25.356
The notion that the President would have the power to conduct a war was not
unimportant to some. For example, Rufus King's explanation that the
insertion of "declare" for "make" did not take away the Executive function to
conduct a war prompted at least one state to change its vote, and if Jackson's
journal is correct, may have reversed a vote against the change.3 57
Once the concerns about the Executive on horseback and the ubiquitous
fears of central government were satisfied, the Commander in Chief Clause
was not controversial. 358 Perhaps, "the [C]ommander in [C]hief [C]lause was
noncontroversial because the Framers intended it to convey tightly

351. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S REcoRDS, supra note 267, at 242, 244; see also Berger, supra note 51, at 37.
352. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S REcoRDs, supra note 267, at 282, 292.
353. See Madison, supra note 267, at 39-40.
354. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 2, 1787), in 1

&

FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 267, at 79, 89; James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional
Convention (June 4, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 267, at 96, 97.
355. See Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 4, 1787), supra note 354,
at 103-05. For the most extensive discussion of the commander in chief power, see Barron
Leddennan, supra note 253.
356. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 25, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 267, at 3, 3; Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 786-87
(stating that the Commander in Chief power was first proposed by Charles Pinckney on May 29,
1787).
357. Barron& Lederman, supra note 253, at 790.
358. Id. at 786.
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circumscribed authority." 359 The Ratifiers viewed the Commander in Chief
power as the narrow power to conduct the nation's military operations. 360
Nevertheless, this carried a great power and potential for abuse. This
made the Commander in Chief a matter in some ratifying conventions. 361
Some Ratifiers expressed the fear that an unscrupulous president may become
like a king in that he would use the army to ensure punishment. 362
Nevertheless, the Conventions were persuaded that the Commander in Chief
power would be a limited one.363
The best description of this power came from Hamilton in the
Federalist.364 Hamilton's argument was practical-a single voice was needed

to carry out a war: "[T]he direction of a war most peculiarly demands those
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." 365
Hamilton's more general comments on the advantage of a single
Executive reveal the practical nature of his argument. 366 For example, in the
Federalist, No. 70, Hamilton extolled the energy of a single Executive saying:
"That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity,
secrecy, and [dispatch] will generally characterize the proceedings of one man
in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater, number;
and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished." 367 Moreover, multiple executives increase the possibility of
disagreement among themselves and the people, and "tend[] to conceal faults
and destroy responsibility."

368

359. Reveley, supra note 259, at 113; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 786

(arguing that the Framers' lack of debate regarding the commander in chief power demonstrated
the Framers' understanding of that clause, an understanding which was reflected in the preconvention limitation imposed on state executives); David Luban, On the Commander in Chief
Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 484 (2008) (arguing the Framers understood the power to confer
"limited authority" and later history does not broaden such authority).
360. Luban, supra note 359, at 567 ("If a power is not that of military command, the
presumption should be that the Commander in Chief Clause does not entail it."); Reveley, supra
note 259, at 128.
361. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 794 ("There were occasional statements
addressing the issue, including some that reflected a concern about the President having an
uncontrollable command power. But such statements were not left unchallenged by those who
defended the document.").
362. Id. at 794-95.

363. See id. (arguing that the Executive's powers were perceived to be limited by the
drafters of the Constitution).
364. See THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
365. Id.; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 798-99.
366. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
367. Id.
368. Id.
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Hamilton described the substantial power of the Commander in Chief
Clause in comparison to the English Crown.36 9 Where the King of Great
Britain had command of his armies "at all times," the President could have
only "occasional command" of the armed forces as were called into actual
service of the Union. 370 He described the Commander in Chief power as much
inferior to the King's:
[N]othing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the
Confederacy; while that of the British King extends to the [declaring]
of war and to the [raising] and [regulating] of fleets and armies, all
which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to
the legislature. 371
Hamilton thought that the President's power was not even as great as
that of some state governors.3 72 Edward Corwin interpreted Hamilton to
mean that, in war, the President would be:
[T]op general and top admiral of the forces provided by Congress, so
that no one can be put over him or be authorized to give him orders
in the direction of the said forces; but otherwise he will have no
powers that any high military or naval commander not also President
might not have.3 73

The result was a Constitution that split the war commencing and war
conducting powers.3 74 Professor Van Alstyne summarized the result of
vesting the war commencing power in Congress and the war-conducting
power in the President.3 75

If it is the case that the Congress has made a suitable determination
to authorize the use of armed force to effectuate national policy in
any given instance, then discretion concerning affiliated logistical,
369.
370.
371.
372.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 797.
373. CORWIN, OFFICE AND POWERS, supra note 50, at 228.
374. Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 802 ("[T]he system of war powers the
Framers appear to have favored comports quite well with their well-established embrace of
checks and balances, a belief that was itself rooted in their practical experience with the dangers
of unconstrained executive authority, particularly in war.").
375. Van Alstyne, supra note 310, at 9.
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tactical, and strategic decisions properly reposes with the presidency,
consistent always, however, with the scope of the antecedent
congressional declaration. 376
To paraphrase Van Alstyne, the Constitution allows the Congress to
authorize the President to conduct a war. In turn, the Constitution restricts the
President to the war authorized by Congress.377
The question remains about the scope of any emergency presidential
power prior to any congressional declaration of war. 378 Madison and Gerry's
motion to substitute "declare" for "make" carried with it the coda "leaving to
the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." 3 79 The delegates apparently
accepted this notion as self-evident. No debate was recorded on this issue. The
absence of debate does not help to delimit the power. Although mentioned by
Madison in his motion and not debated, the Framers did not include language
to that effect in the text of the Constitution. 380 The Framers constitutionalized
some aspects of emergency powers. In Article I, Section 8, Clause 15,
Congress is given the power to call out "the Militia . . . to suppress

Insurrections and repel Invasions." 381 Once "called into the actual [s]ervice of
the United States," the President is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy."382 Finally, the Constitution forbid states to "engage in [w]ar, unless
actually invaded, or in such prominent [d]anger as will not admit of delay." 383
These references suggest several principles. Congress and the States were
expected to respond to sudden emergency: Congress by calling out the militia,
and the States when faced with a threat that required immediate action. 384
Although the President is not mentioned, the thrust of debate on August 16,
1787, showed that the Framers intended to lodge some emergency power in
the President.385 The extent of this power is not clear, however.

376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 312-14.
379. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 268, at 476.
380. See id.
381. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
382. Id. art. II, § 2.
383. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see also Heather Dwyer, The State War Power: A Forgotten
Constitutional Clause, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REv. 319, 320 (2012) (arguing that a state may
engage in defensive war in some circumstances).
384. For an argument that the states also possess war powers, see Dwyer, supra note 383,
at 322.
385. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 268, at 468-69.
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Raoul Berger interprets Madison's motion literally. 386 The President has
emergency power only to respond to an actual invasion. 387 "Viewed against
repudiation of royal prerogative, no more can be distilled from the MadisonGerry remark than a limited grant to the President of power to repel attack
when, as the very terms 'sudden attack' imply, there could be no time to
consult with Congress."388
Berger sees a connection between the Framers' limitation of the
presidential power and nuclear warfare. 389
We are apt to think that devastating surprise is peculiar to our times,
forgetting that the Founders had lived through surprise massacres in
frontier forts and settlements and well knew such havoc. It was that
experience which led them to leave imminent danger of Indian
attacks to the individual threatened state.390
Professor Ratner, although ultimately reaching a different conclusion,
agrees with Berger that "[i]n 1787, 'repel sudden attack' probably meant
'resist invasion or rebellion. '391
Even the means by which a President may resist sudden attack may be
limited.392 Professor Lofgren noted the Framers' apparent familiarity with the
nineteenth century concept of perfect and imperfect warfare. 393 Perfect war
was formally declared and engaged in by nation states while imperfect war
was not declared but "where a certain violent protection of . . rights is
necessary." 394 This violence would be carried out by state authorized reprisals
against the property of another nation.395 Contemporary writers noted the link
between reprisals and imperfect war.396 Lofgren concludes that the inclusion
of the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal was not superfluous but

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

See Berger, supra note 51, at 34.
Id. at 41.
Id.
See id. at 43 (comparing threat of attack to threats such as the Cuban missile crisis).
Id.
Ratner, supra note 310, at 467.
See, e.g., Press Release, Restricting First Use Act, supra note 3.
Lofgren, supra note 312, at 689-93.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

47

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7
160

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71: 113]

rather was intended to give Congress the power over the commencement of
war either declared or undeclared. 97
If so, then the President's constitutional emergency powers in lime of
sudden attack would be limited to defensive measures. That is, he or she could
defend against the attack but could not go further and perform reprisals, i.e.,
acts of war. In other words, any defensive response must be proportionate to
the threat. Any decision to commence war, either declared or undeclared, must
be taken by Congress. Once taken, the President, as Commander in Chief,
must carry out the war as declared by Congress.3 98
This study of the historical record suggests several principles that apply
to the contemporary use of nuclear weapons: First, the President has no
authority to initiate or prosecute aggressive war.399 Second, the President has
authority to use force to defend the country against attack. 400 Third, the
President may not expand the action beyond its defensive nature. 401 Fourth,
Congress may authorize the President to fight aggressive war and to use any
weapons at his disposal. 402 Fifth, Congress may restrict the President's
conduct of the war.403
Little in the historical record suggests that the President has any power,
inherent, textual, or otherwise, to initiate war.40 4 The Framers' fear of
397. Id. at 700. But see Sidak, supra note 339, at 499 ("The Quasi War cases [interpreting
the letters of marque and reprisal] concern national sovereignty and supremacy, not the
separation of powers.").
398. See, e.g., Reinstein, supra note 223, at 263 (suggesting three limitations on implied
presidential powers where Congress prevails when conflict occurs).
399. Zheyao Li, Note, War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional
Interpretation in the Age ofAsymmetric Warfare, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 373, 402 (2009)

("[A]ny Presidential claim of a preclusive war power with respect to other nation-states would
be inconsistent with the Constitution.").
400. Id. (distinguishing non-state actors as requiring bold Presidential defensive action);
see also Thomas P. Crocker, PresidentialPower and ConstitutionalResponsibility, 52 B.C. L.

REv. 1551, 1626 (2011) ("A president has great responsibility, but part of that responsibility is
not only to execute the laws with care and fidelity, but also to play a role in constituting the
community through constitutional practices and commitments.").
401. See Reinstein, supra note 223, at 263.
402. See Lofgren, supra note 312, at 680 (explaining the President could direct the war
after congressional authorization).
403. Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 800.
404. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 296, at 4 ("The powerto go to warwas not left to solitary
action by a single executive, but to collective decision making through parliamentary
deliberations."); Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 800 ("There is simply too much
evidence suggesting a Founding-era understanding under which the legislature possessed the
power to subject the Executive to control over all matters pertaining to warmaking, save those
that would deprive him of superintendence."). But see JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE 141-42 (2005) (describing the original understanding of war powers as giving the
President significant unilateral authority over deployment of military while congressional
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centralized power, their recent colonial experience, and the distribution of
power among the three branches all point to congressional control over the
decision to go to war.4 05 Louis Fisher concludes that there was little doubt
about the limited scope of the President's war power. The duty to repel sudden
attacks represents an emergency measure that permits the president to take
actions necessary to resist sudden attacks either against the mainland of the
United States or against American troops abroad. The President never
received a general power to deploy troops "whenever and wherever he thought
best, and the Framers did not authorize him to take the country into full-scale
war or to mount an offensive attack against another nation." 406
On the other hand, the record is clear that the Framers intended the
President to perform the practical function of guarding the nation against
attack. 407 A multiple member Congress should be entrusted with the decision
to go to war, 408 but it would be impossible for that same Congress to convene
in time to authorize a defense against a sudden attack. 409 Nevertheless, the
declaration of war is exclusive to Congress, while the war fighting
responsibility is shared by the President and Congress. 41 0 Therefore, although
control only came through its power of the purse); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN
INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006) (reemphasizing the President's authority
over wartime decisions within the context of the war on terror).
405. KEYNES, supra note 212, at 29-30; MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 268, at 476.
406. FISHER, supra note 296, at 8-9; see also Louis Fisher, HistoricalSurvey of the War
Power and the Use of Force, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND POWER TO Go TO WAR:
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 13 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994)
[hereinafter Fisher, Historical Survey] (noting the careful limitations on the power of the
President to repel sudden attacks).
407. See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers,69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002)

(explaining nineteenth century nations understood many actions tantamount to a declaration of
war, and this understanding captures the conventional wisdom that only Congress can initiate
hostile, offensive action, but the President can use force defensively); see also Saikrishna
Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by Declare War, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 120-21 (2007) (discussing the eighteenth century view that hostile signals

were regarded as declarations of war because they "evinced a resort to warfare to settle
differences").
408. See Alfred W. Blumrosen & Steven M. Blumrosen, Restoring the CongressionalDuty

to Declare War, 63 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 407, 413 (2011) (noting that the Constitution prevents
a single person from committing the nation to war); see also Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the
Commander in Chiefand Congress: ConcurrentPower Over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST.

L.J. 391, 398 (2008) ("The President has the power of initiative, the ability and authority to act
quickly in the face of rapidly changing wartime realities in the theater of action. Congress, on
the other hand, has a more deliberative, reflective power, allowing it to check and limit
presidential initiative both before and after the Executive acts.").
409. See Ramsey, supra note 407, at 1550 (noting Madison's argument for the President's
power to repeal sudden attacks "without the delay of consulting Congress").
410. Rogers, supra note 255, at 1196, 1212; see also Prakash, supra note 407, at 45 ("The
Constitution grants the 'declare war' power to Congress only, and hence only Congress can
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the President may meet a sudden attack, the President must seek congressional
'

41
approval to go beyond defense.

There is no constitutional limitation on the prosecution of an aggressive
war, however. The Constitution sets out a procedure to follow in order to
commit the nation to war.412 It does not set any limitations on what kind of
war Congress may authorize. 413

Congressional supremacy also extends to the conduct of the war.4 1 4 A
declared war is a perfect war but the implicit recognition of an imperfect
war in the Constitution suggests the Framers wanted Congress to have the
first, ultimate, and on-going say on the question of war. 415 The Commander
in Chief Clause is given consent by congressional authorization to make
war.4 1 6 It was not meant to be the President's separate reservoir of war
powers.4 17

decide whether the United States will start a war or wage war against a nation that already has
declared war against the United States. Under the original Constitution, the President cannot
make these fateful choices.").
411. See Ramsey, supra note 407, at 1626-3 1.
412. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. See generally 3 PRECEDENTS OF THE U.S HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ch. 13, § 5 (Lewis Deschler ed., 1994) (detailing the procedures followed
for declarations of war since 1936).
413. Indeed, Congress may have the power to require the President to escalate the level of
conflict. See Russell A. Spivak, Co-ParentingWar Powers: Congress s Authority to Escalate
Conflicts, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 135, 136 (2018); see also Charles Tiefer, Can CongressMake a

President Step up a War?, 71 LA. L. REV. 391 (2011) (setting out an analytical template for
analyzing situations involving a "hawkish" Congress).
414. "The war power of the national government is 'the power to wage war successfully.'
It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and
progress." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes,
&

War Powers Under the Constitution, 2 MARQ. L. REV. 3, 9 (1917)); see also Barron

Lederman, supra note 253, at 691-92 (indicating a lack of historical evidence that Congress
could not control the conduct of a war).
415. THE FEDERALISTNO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton); Lobel, supra note 408, at 466 ("The
Framers of the Constitution intended that Congress have substantial power to control the conduct
of warfare it has authorized. The consistent history of congressional restrictions confirms that
the Constitution grants Congress concurrent power to decide not only whether to initiate warfare,
but how and in what manner those authorized wars should be fought.").
416. Barron & Lederman, supra note 253, at 802 ("The title 'commander in chief' did not
necessarily imply that its holder possessed any power to operate free from statutory control; to
the contrary, there are important indications that the Framers assumed up to and including the
moment of ratification that a person so named would be subject to such control."); John C.
Dehn, The Commander-in-Chiefand the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework, 83

TEMP. L. REV. 599, 664 (2011) ("Our government can only prevent executive usurpation of our
national war powers by observing and enforcing the implied and subordinate nature of the
Commander-in-Chief power.").
417. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War,

82

CORNELL

L. REV. 695, 700 (1997) (examining evidence that supports congressional primacy
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VI. A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Professor Bums Weston has proposed a contextual analysis of the legality
of nuclear weapons under international law. 418 The problems faced in that
forum are similar to those faced when discussing nuclear weapons legality
under the Constitution. Weston responds to the contention that the continued
existence of the weapons themselves is an argument for their legality. 419 In
addition, no international treaty clearly outlaws nuclear weapons and further
there is confusion over the source of any implied authority to promulgate a
general prohibition.420
Weston shows that such thinking is influenced by the assumptions it
makes

about the world

and the international

legal

system. 42 1 Such

assumptions, based on a statist and centrist notion of world affairs, are out of
place in a world threatened by Nuclear Armageddon. 422
Because the absence of any treaty, prohibition makes it impossible to
assess the legality vel non of nuclear weapons, Weston analyzes the legality
of these weapons in the contexts in which they are likely to be used. 423 He
applies the rules he derives to each context.424
This approach and Weston's justification of it have clear analogues in
constitutional law. The lack of any explicit constitutional condemnation of
weapons of mass destruction and the continued acceptance of our nuclear
arsenal by Congress serve only to establish the proposition that nuclear
weapons are not per se unconstitutional. Instead, the Constitution's structural
and procedural provisions appear to require that a pragmatic judgment be
made on these weapons in the contexts in which they will actually be used.425
Weston posits only defensive scenarios. 426 He concludes that any number
of international treaties and practices outlaw the offensive use of nuclear
weapons. 427 Moreover, all the nations which possess these weapons admit to

in declaring war by, among other things, showing that the Constitution does not allow the
President to veto a declaration of war).
418. See generallyWeston, supra note 219.
419. Id. at 548.
420. Id. at 548.
421. Id. at 545.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 553.
424. Id. at 554-60.
425. Carter, supra note 88, at 199.
426. See Weston, supra note 219, at 568.
427. See id. at 590.
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intending only defensive use. 428 This cannot apply to a constitutional analysis,
however. As we have seen above, Congress can authorize an aggressive
war. 429 Such authorization would supersede any treaties to the contrary for
constitutional purposes. 43 0

Nevertheless, the answer is straightforward: Any offensive action,
conventional or nuclear, must have prior congressional approval. Congress
may choose to authorize perfect war, through a declaration, or imperfect war,
through congressional resolution.431 The Constitution would not stand in the
way of aggressive war. Any obstacles to aggressive war would be political
and not legal.432
Weston posits two general contexts with specific sub-contexts within
each. The general categories are: First-strike (initiating or preemptive)
defensive uses; and Second Strike (retaliatory) defensive uses. Nuclear
weapons can be used in each context in the following ways: (1) Strategic
nuclear warfare, which includes counter-value (societal) targeting and
counterforce (military) targeting; and (2) Tactical nuclear warfare, which
comprises theater (intermediate) targeting and battlefield (limited)
targeting. 433

A.

FirstStrike, Counter-Value Targeting

In this scenario, the President would order a nuclear strike on the
opponent's cities with strategic weapons in response to a perceived threat of
attack on the United States. In theory, a preemptive, counter-value strike is
designed to deter the opponent from attacking by inflicting enormous damage
on its society. It is likely, however, to invite the opponent to respond in kind.
A nuclear opponent whose cities have been decimated by large-scale nuclear
428. See, e.g., BEATRICE HEUSER,
STRATEGIES AND FORCES FOR EUROPE,

NATO, BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE FRG: NUCLEAR
1949-2000 (1997); Military Doctrine of the Russian

Federation of 2014, para. 27 (Russ.); Julian Coman, Pentagon Wants Mini-Nukes' to Fight
Terrorists, TELEGRAPH
(Oct.
26,
2003),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor

Idnews/northamerica/usa/1445165/Pentagon-wants-mini-nukes-to-fight-terrorists.html
[https://penna.cc/66LT-Y6S4]; see also RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 132, at 76.
429. See Lofgren, supra note 312, at 680.
430. Weston, supra note 219, at 566 (noting that states are not obliged to comply with
treaties if they are not party to or failed to object to the agreement); see Fisher,HistoricalSurvey,
supra note 406, at 11.
431. See Lobel, supra note 408, at 466-67 ("Accordingly, the Constitution sensibly
accords the President considerable flexibility and discretion to prosecute a war, but permits
Congress to maintain the ultimate authority to decide whether the President's policies and
strategies are those the nation should follow.").
432. Garcia, supra note 216, at 523.
433. Weston, supra note 219, at 575.
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weapons has little to lose by launching a retaliatory attack on the United
States. 43 4 It seems disingenuous to describe first strike, counter-value
targeting as defensive. Nevertheless, the constitutional question concerns the
President's ability to respond to a threat of attack.
It is undisputed that the President can respond defensively to an attack. 43 5
The issue here, however, is the nature of the response and the imminence of
the attack. As our historical study points out, the Framers were familiar with
surprise attacks. 43 6 The notion, self-evident to them, that the President could
respond seems limited to "imminent" attacks, however.437 These would be
attacks where there would be no opportunity to convene Congress for
consultation or to ask for a declaration. It is for this reason that Raoul Berger
confines imminent to the case of missiles actually falling on the United
States. 438 As a first principle, then, counter-value targeting must wait until the
nuclear attack is imminent; that is, at least until the opponent's missiles are in
the air. 439

A second principle, however, further supports the conclusion against a
first strike against counter-value targets. Our historical study shows that the
President may not expand the military action beyond its defensive scope. 440
This implies a proportionality principle. 4 That is, the President's defensive
response must be in proportion to the attack. A first strike, however, is based
on the speculation that the opponent will attack.442 There is no way to judge
proportionality in this case. Thus, to be faithful to the values enshrined in the
Constitution, one must conclude that first strike, counter-value targeting must
await congressional approval.443

434.
435.
436.
437.

See, e.g., BORDEN, supra note 33.

See Berger, supra note 51, at 49.
See supra notes 204-417 and accompanying text.
Berger, supra note 51, at 44.

438. Id. at 45.
439. See Weston, supra note 219, at 577-79; see also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE
CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 244 (2007) (arguing that a threat short of an act of
war does not justify a preemptive strike against enemy which would be an intrusion on Congress'
exclusive power to declare war).

440. See supra Part V.
441. Cf Vicki C. Jackson, ConstitutionalLaw in an Age ofProportionality, 124 YALE L.J.

3094, 3098 (2015) (embodying the notion that the larger the harm imposed should be justified
by more weighty reasons).
442. See Weston, supra note 219, at 579.
443. See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, ConstitutionalDictatorship:Its Dangers

and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1789, 1818 (2010) (stating that unilateral presidential power
to order a nuclear attack "is as close to unconstrained power as one can imagine").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

53

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7
166

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71: 113]

The idea behind the proportionality principle is to allow Congress to
convene to decide the country's proper response.4 4 4 A preemptive,
counter-value strike virtually assures the beginning of a retaliatory spiral,
where first the opponent and then the United States respond to one another's
barrages with an attack of their own. In this situation, a first strike is just
that: the initiation of warfare. The Constitution requires congressional
approval.
The second scenario to consider is a preemptive strike against so-called
counterforce targets, that is, military targets. In theory, such a first strike is
limited to the military installations which are capable of carrying out a nuclear
attack on the United States.4 45 In practice, however, such targeting would
cause enormous collateral damage.4 4 6 Such damage would assure a retaliatory
strike. 4 4 7 Thus, the proportionality principle would rule out any such
preemptive attack.
Tactical preemptive strikes against military targets might be different,
however. In theory, these strikes would be against military targets using lowyield weapons.4 48 The problem comes in applying the proportionality
principle in light of the enormous power of even low yield weapons. 449 So
called tactical weapons can range from small battlefield weapons only a
fraction of the size of the Hiroshima weapon to bombs which rival the power
of strategic weapons delivered by inter-ballistic missiles. 45 0 The use of one of

these latter weapons against a military target could potentially cause the same
kind of disproportionate collateral damage that counterforce strategic
weapons cause. In either case, the first use of such weapons virtually assures
an enlargement of the conflict beyond its defensive scope. 451
The constitutionality of preemptive tactical strikes depends on the size of
the weapon used. A truly low-yield weapon, the use of which does not invite
strategic response, might satisfy the defensive and proportionality
444. See Li, supra note 399, at 402 ("The Framers intended the slow, deliberative process
by which Congress makes its decisions to be a check against executive aggression and
aggrandizement.").
445. See Stone, supra note 105, at 17 (describing this as a "pre-emptive 'forestalling'
attack").
446. See id. at 17-18.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 18.
449. See RHODES, ARSENALS OF FOLLY, supra note 132, at 102-03.
450. See

generally

Tactical

Weapons

Systems,

ENCYCLOPEDIA

BRITANNICA

(July
20,
1998),
https://www.britannica.com/technology/tactical-weapons-system
[https://perma.cc/CH56-B5J2].
451. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 207, at 789 ("A broad range of informed opinion,
running across the political spectrum, agrees that nuclear escalation of a conventional European
war would probably be uncontrollable, that 'limited' nuclear war is a contradiction in terms.").
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Professor Weston employs the same distinction in his analysis

of the international law rules governing nuclear war. 453 He defines a tactical
weapon as one below the 13 to 22 kiloton level of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
weapons.41

Using this as our baseline, the question then becomes can the first use of
nuclear weapons ever be both defensive and proportionate.45 5 First, the use of
tactical weapons absent congressional approval to preempt a conventional
attack would not be proportionate to the threat posed by the adversary. 56
Indeed, the President has the responsibility to defend the United States. In the
likely situation, however, a conventional force would be arrayed against
United States forces deployed in a foreign country.45 7 This is a qualitatively
different case from missiles falling on the United States. The President would
not be defending the United States against sudden attack.45 8 Rather, the
situation would undoubtedly have developed over a period of time.459 During
this interim, Congress could convene to consider the extent of presidential
authority. 46 0 Without such authority, the President must meet conventional
force with conventional force.
The use of tactical weapons to preempt a tactical nuclear attack would
follow the same analysis. The likely development of such a crisis over a
relatively long period of time would allow Congress to debate the question.461
The principle of proportionate response would limit presidential authority
on the second use of nuclear weapons to a tactical nuclear attack. Absent

452. But see Louis Rend Beres, In a Dark Time: The Expected Consequencesof an India-

PakistanNuclear Exchange, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 497, 513 (1998) (reasoning that even a
limited nuclear conflict could cause devasting human, biological, and environmental effects
beyond the region where attack occurred).
453. Weston, supra note 219, at 579.
454. Id. at 582.

455. See REVELEY, supra note 232, at 356 n.22 (suggesting that using nuclear weapons
initiates new conflict).
456. See Stone, supra note 105, at 8.
457. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 207, at 787, 790; see also William C. Banks, FirstUse
ofNuclear Weapons: The ConstitutionalRole of a CongressionalLeadership Committee, 13 J.

LEGIS. 1, 1-2 (1986) (stating that War Powers Act grants the President discretion to commit
forces to "national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces").
458. Stone, supra note 105, at 8.
459. Raven-Hansen, supra note 207, at 790 ("But today the probable scenario of nuclear
escalation of a conventional war in Europe presents a very different time frame. NATO
commanders and defense experts have estimated that such an attack will yield at least 2 to 3
days in which to make a first-use decision, and probably more to the extent that Warsaw Pact
mobilization efforts provide advance warning.").
460. Id.
461. See Stone, supra note 105, at 5.
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congressional approval, the President could not respond to a tactical strike
with a strategic strike. Assuming a proportionate response, however, the
second use of nuclear weapons would not violate the constitutional norms that
animated the Framers.
The Constitution might not preclude the use of a tactical response to a
conventional attack. Nothing in the historical study would prevent the
President from using the weapons at his disposal to defend American
troops. 462 Nevertheless, the risk that using nuclear weapons to defend against
a conventional attack would expand the conflict beyond its defensive context
and would outweigh the necessity for their use.

463

The guiding principle

should be that in all but the most extreme circumstances Congress must
authorize the initiation of conflict and its conduct. 464 There would be ample
time for Congress to debate the nature and extent of presidential authority.4 65
In summary, the principles the Framers embedded in the Constitution
require prior congressional authorization before the President launches a
strategic preemptive strike. 4 66 By the same token, the same principles require
congressional authorization prior to any preemptive tactical strike. On the
other hand, a defensive retaliation in kind would not require constitutional
approval. A retaliation out of proportion to the attack would require prior
congressional authorization.
VII. RESTORING THE BALANCE
This Article focuses on the norm of prior congressional authorization.467
A thorough analysis on how to implement that norm is beyond the scope of
462. See id. at 19.
463. See id. at 8.
464. See Charles Tiefer, The FAS Proposal: Valid Check or UnconstitutionalVeto?, in
FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?, supra note
88, at 143, 156-59 (demonstrating strong historical role of Congress).
465. See Reid Skibell, Separation-of-Powers and the Commander in Chief Congress's
Authority to Override PresidentialDecisions in CrisisSituations, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 183,

185 (2004) ("Congress's war powers are sufficiently robust that it can countermand presidential
decisions justified under a broad interpretation of the commander-in-chief power.").
466. See Jonathan G. D'Errico, The Specter of a Generalissimo: The Original
Understandingof the President'sDefensive War Powers, 42 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 153, 156

(2018) ("The Constitution was designed to encourage presidential initiative in the immediate
defense of national borders while necessitating congressional approval to sustain longer
conflicts.").
467. Other limitations on the President, such as cutting congressional funding or initiating
impeachment would be spectacularly ineffective after the President launched a nuclear attack.
See Tung Yin, Structural Objections to the Inherent Commander-in-ChiefPower Thesis, 16
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 965, 978-79 (2007) ("Given the anticipated nature of

nuclear war as involving no more than one or two waves of nuclear strikes by each side,
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this Article but it will be helpful to discuss a few of the possibilities. 468 The
question is "[w]hat war powers system would enhance the effectiveness of the
United States in making decisions about war and peace." 469
Professor Raven-Hansen laid out the range of possibilities:
Nothing in the present distribution [of the war powers] would bar
Congress from prohibiting first use or early first use. If time
permits-as well it may today or in the near future in the European
first-use scenario-the full Congress could also remove the
prohibition during a conventional war. Congress cannot invade the
[C]ommander in [C]hief's prerogatives by microcommanding the
armed forces, but its power to authorize limited or partial warlimited in this case to conventional war-has been judicially
recognized since 1800.470

Working within the current constitutional structure, Congress could pass
legislation involving itself in making nuclear policy. 47' It could require the
defunding would not allow Congress to terminate the nuclear war initiated by the President.
Similarly, the failure of Congress to declare "total" warbetween the United States and its nuclear
adversary would be of little comfort to either nation with nuclear warheads already on their
annihilating trajectories.").
468. See Ganesh Sitaraman & David Zionts, Behavioral War Powers, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
516, 574-88 (2015), for an interesting approach to designing an improved institutional war
powers decision making process by using the insights of behavioral psychology to create five
institutional designs to regulate the war powers of Congress and the President.
469. Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and ConstitutionalDesign, 115 YALE L.J.
2512, 2515 (2006).
470. Raven-Hansen, supra note 207, at 793-94; see also Antonio F. Perez, A Whole Text
Readingofthe War Powers Clauses: Why the Constitution'sText ObviatesEsoteric War Powers
Debates andEncouragesPolicy FlexibilityandDemocraticAccountability, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB.

POL'Y 861, 863 (2014) ("[Bly enabling the President to act and burdening Congress with
responsibility for enacting constraining legislation, debate will shift ... towards the prudence
and morality of specific decisions, as judged by the People's elected representatives and
ultimately, therefore, the People themselves.").
471. See Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. 1626,
1687-88 (2014) ("Rather than devoting its institutional energy to reasserting its control over
decisions to engage the enemy with military force in particular circumstances, Congress would
work to engage the executive branch more seriously and continually with regard to the general
policy circumstances under which force might be contemplated."). See generally Eric Talbot
Jensen, Future War and the War Powers Resolution, 29 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 499 (2015)
(arguing for an expansion of the War Powers Resolution to include actions by personnel,
supplies, or capabilities, and covering hostilities against and violations of other nation's
sovereignty.) Of course, different constitutional and political questions arise if the President
refuses to comply. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (reasoning that Presidential action rises and falls in conjunction with
congressional approval and disapproval). See Peter Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionalityof the
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President to prepare a quadrennial Nuclear Posture Review and submit it to
Congress for approval. 472 The process could be modeled on the National
Emergencies Act.473 Congress would treat the review as a special bill and be
required to vote on it and submit the results to the President for signature or
approval. If the President vetoed the bill, Congress could override the veto. 4 74

Unlike the National Emergency Act, which imposes strict and fairly short time
frames for congressional action, Congress would be allowed to spend more
time considering the review. 4 75 This approval could be joined with an ongoing requirement that the President inform Congress and consult with
congressional committees on possible changes to the Nuclear Posture
Review.476

Congress could pass legislation in advance to deal with the use of nuclear
weapons 477 or otherwise limit the President's discretion to use nuclear

FAS Proposal: A Critical Summary, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES?, supra note 88, at 211, 211-20, for a list of the different legal

contexts in which presidential first-use might present itself.
472. See, e.g., Nuclear Cruise Missile Reconsideration Act of 2017, H.R. 2667, 115th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (restricting defense funds until the Secretary of Defense complete a
Nuclear Posture Review that "includes an assessment of the capabilities and effects of the use
of the long-range standoff weapon, and for other purposes").
473. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-51 (2012); see also Amy L. Stein, A
Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1245-46 (2018) (proposing a
sliding scale of procedural restraints on the President's foreign affairs powers with Congress
potentially borrowing from the Administrative Procedures Act, the National Environmental
Policy of Act of 1969, and other similar statutory procedural schemes).
474. See, e.g., National Emergencies Act § 1631 (requiring the President to submit an
emergency declaration to Congress for approval, which must vote on it within a brief period).
475. The National Emergencies Act requires action within several weeks. See id.
§ 1622(b). Voting so quickly on the nuclear posture review would not be necessary, although
Congress would still be required to vote.
476. See, e.g., JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION
REPORT 10 (2008) (aiming to improve the largely ineffective War Powers Resolution of 1973);
see also Julia L. Chen, Restoring ConstitutionalBalance:Accommodating the Evolution of War,
53 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1770 (2012) (arguing for a broader and more flexible approach that would
require meaningful consultation between the President and the Congress); Brenda Flynn, The
War Powers ConsultationAct: Keeping War out of the Zone of Twilight, 64 CATH. U. L. REV.
1007, 1009 (2015) (discussing the proposed War Powers Consultation Act). But see Matthew
Fleischman, A FunctionalDistributionof War Powers, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 137,
145 (2010) (arguing for a significantly different War Powers Act that greatly reduces the time
for congressional notice and consideration).
477. For a general discussion on how Congress might use its "power of the purse" to
control the President's use of nuclear weapons, see Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks,
Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 942-43 (1994)
(reasoning that power is broad but not unlimited and may infringe on presidential power).
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weapons.4 78 As opposed to the broad delegation of control to the President in
the Atomic Energy Act, 479 Congress could pre-authorize specific uses under
specific circumstances. 4 0 Congress also could approach the matter as the
Markey-Lieu legislation does and declare that "[i]t shall be the policy of the
United States that no first-use nuclear strike should be conducted absent a
48
declaration of war by Congress."s

Finally, we could amend the Constitution. 48 2 Perhaps nuclear weapons
have rendered the Constitution's imprecise processes obsolete and the
consequences of nuclear war so severe that we have to rethink the balance of
war powers. 483 Any structural changes to the war powers would require a
constitutional amendment.4814 For example, Edward Corwin and the
Federation of American Scientists suggested special committee approval or

478. See also Waxman, supra note 471, at 1687-88 ("Rather than devoting its institutional
energy to reasserting its control over decisions to engage the enemy with military force in
particular circumstances, Congress would work to engage the executive branch more seriously
and continually with regard to the general policy circumstances under which force might be
contemplated."). See generally BAKER, supra note 476, at 12.
479. See 42 U.S.C. § 2121 (2012); see also Flynn, supra note 476, at 1009 (discussing the
proposed War Powers Consultation Act).
480. Alberto R. Gonzales,Advising the President: The Growing Scope ofExecutive Power
to Protect America, 38 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 451, 507 (2015) ("Under the appropriate
circumstances, and when time permits, Congress should insist on prior consultation. Congress
must engage in vigorous oversight and be unafraid to question executive action and to test the
assumptions that drive executive decisions."); see also Jonathan T. Menitove, Once More Unto
the Breach: American War Power and a Second Legislative Attempt to Ensure Congressional
Input, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 773, 798 (2010) (arguing for a revision of the defense
appropriation process to allow Congress to reassert its authority over decisions to go to war).
481. Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act, H.R. 669, 116th Cong. (2019)
(defining first use as an attack using nuclear weapons against an enemy without President
determining whether enemy first launched a nuclear strike against U.S. or an ally).
482. See Goldstein, supra note 12, at 1592; see also Ray Forrester, PresidentialWars in
the Nuclear Age: An Unresolved Problem, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1636, 1641 (1989)
(suggesting three "nuclear footballs" in the hands of President, Speaker of the House, and
President pro tem, all of whom would have to agree to launch nuclear weapons). See generally
Donald A. Dechert, III, Note, PerpetualWarfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional
Amendmentfor the War Powers, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2018) (arguing that constitutional
amendment is the solution to the problematic state of using military force).
483. Goldstein, supra note 12, at 1543 ("As the dangers of war have increased
exponentially since the time when the Constitution was ratified, the efficacy of the constitutional
safeguards which were intended to limit the likelihood of war has dwindled dramatically.").
484. Id. But see Banks, supra note 457, at 2 ("Still acting under the War Powers Act, the
President chooses not to consult Congress before firing the nuclear weapons.").
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legislative vetoes.485 These methods would contravene the constitutional

process for making law and, thus, require a constitutional amendment.4816
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This discussion takes on an otherworldly tone after a while. 4'7 Some good
can come about if, as Herman Kahn said, this discussion "takes the edge off
the bizarreness, i.e., if it makes it easier to discuss the problem and to weigh
various policies on their merits, rather than on relatively thoughtless (though
often deeply held) emotional reactions." 8 The Framers could never have
anticipated mass destruction weapons like nuclear bombs. 489 We can
articulate the general but indeterminate principles very well, but we have no
way of knowing if the Framers would have modified these principles if they
lived in the nuclear age. 490 In the end, the nuclear age may require new

485. See Banks, supra note 457, at 2-3. Compare EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE
83-84, 155 (13th ed. 1973), with Stone, supra
note 105, at 11 (requiring the President to get approval of a "planning committee" consisting of
high-ranking legislative officials and committee chairs).
486. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (finding legislative veto inconsistent
with the "finely wrought" constitutional procedure to make law). But see Tiefer, supra note 464,
at 143-44 (arguing that Chadha does not apply to war powers); Banks, supra note 457, at 4
(suggesting committee violates neither Chadha nor the separation of powers); Hemesath, supra
note 11, at 2502 (urging passage of new War Powers Resolution to remove "ambiguities"). See
generallyJoseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a ConstitutionalImpasse:
A "JointDecision " Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367 (1988) (proposing a "joint decision" framework
modeled on but going beyond the War Powers Resolution).
487. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 88, at 109 (discussing nuclear war in legalistic terms
"eerie and disquieting"); Hernan Kahn, Nuclear Proliferation and Rules of Retaliation, 76
YALE L.J. 77, 89 (1966) (discussing retaliation scenarios had "many bizarre aspects").
488. HERMAN KAHN, IN DEFENSE OF THINKING (Herman Kahn ed., Hudson Inst. 1962).
In an essay adapted from his book Thinking About the Unthinkable, Kahn stated that he was
tempted to reply to critics who accused him of icy rationality by asking: "Would you prefer a
warm, human error? Do you feel better with a nice emotional mistake?" Id. GHAMORI-TABRIZI,
supra note 32, at 42.
489. But see Note, Recapturing the War Power, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1815, 1836 (2006)
("Although the United States' geopolitical position has changed dramatically since the
Founding, many of the concerns underlying our separated and sequenced war powers-the fear
of executive overreach and provocation of conflict, as well as the need for unitary and swift
decision making in the areas of foreign affairs, national defense, and protection of commerce
abroad continue to be relevant today.").
490. See Fleischman,supra note 476, at 146.
CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY,
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constitutional rules and not recourse to the old principles.

49

' The only way to

know, however, is to apply the old principles to the new age.492
The point of this Article was to explore the truth of Jefferson's claim that
the Constitution has chained "the dog of war." 493 In an age of clipper ships
and slow-moving armies without means of immediate communication,
Jefferson may have been correct. One hopes the constitutional structures that
could constrain eighteenth century annies will have an effect on the use of
nuclear weapons.

491. Id. ("[O]riginalism has taken the war powers debate as far as it can go, and it is time
to answer this question by an alternative means.").
492. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 443, at 1866 ("We cannot leave the growth of
republics to chance and circumstance; one must design systems for emergencies in advance to
head off problems before they occur. That is why all students of constitutionalism, including
those who study the presidency, must also be students of constitutional design.").
493. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392-98 (JulianP. Boyd ed., 1958).
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